Babele 2 = English to learn

§ 1°GBal: Crucial vote for Greece and Europe.

2011-11-05T11:09:00.000-07:00

Index/1°GB || § → 2nd - || WB

Greek Prime Minister G. Papandreou

Sommario: A. Euronews: 1. Crucial vote for Greece and Europe. – B. Assemblea Generale Onu (66ª) Settembre 2011: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Iran). – C. Press-TV:

Crucial vote for Greece and Europe

Euronews: 04/11/2011/05:33/ - Audio.
Link: http://www.euronews.net/2011/11/04/vote-crucial-for-greece-and-europe/

Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou faces a knife-edge vote of confidence today. It comes after his announcement to hold a referendum on the bailout plan for both Greece and the euro zone stunned world leaders on Monday.

That plan appears to have back-fired, with calls for him to stand down and defections from his party to the extent that he is now in danger of losing the vote if just two of his deputies rebel.

He had earlier agreed to drop the idea of a referendum if he could secure opposition support for the European bailout plan.

Antonis Samaris

But opposition leader Antonis Samaris was unimpressed and called for snap elections before dramatically walking out of parliament with his MPs.

Some analysts now say that while it is highly unlikely that a referendum will take place, it is also unlikely that Papandreou will win the confidence vote.

The outcome is not expected until late Friday night.

News Words: 25: analyst, announcement, bailout, confidence, danger, defection, election, euro, Friday, idea, leader, minister, Monday, opposition, outcome, parlamient, party, place, plan, referendum, support, today, vote, world, zone.

66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

New York, 23 September 2011

H. E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Testo: http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/IR_en.pdf
Audio-video: http://gadebate.un.org/66/iran-islamic-republic

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Address by
H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Before the
66th Session of the
United Nations General Assembly
New York
23 September 2011

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful “All praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Universe, and peace and blessing be upon our Master and Prophet, Mohammad, and his pure Household, and his noble Companions and on all diine messengers”

“Oh, God, hasten the arrival of Imam Al-Mahdi and grant him good health and victory and make us his followers and those who attest to his rightfufness”

Mr. President,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am grateful to the Almighty Allah who granted me, once more, the opportunity to appear before this world assembly. I have the pleasure to express my sincere thanks to H. E. Joseph Deiss, president of the sixty-fifth session for his tremendous efforts during his tenure. I also would like to congratulate H.E Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser on his election as the president of sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly and wish him all success.

Let me seize the moment to pay tribute to all those who lost their lives in the past year, particularly to the victims of the tragic famine in Somalia and the devastating flood in Pakistan and especially the earthquake and the ensuing explosions in the nuclear power plant in Japan. I urge everyone to intensify their assistance and aid to the affected populations in these countries.

Over the past years, I spoke about different global issues, and the need to introduce fundamental changes in the current international order.

~ ~

§ 0°GB: Index - Inglese Corso Progressivo in 96 paragrafi (§§)

2011-10-30T11:58:00.000-07:00

Corso Progressivo

§ 1°GB: Sommario: 1. Subject pronouns: he, it. – 2. Present Tense “to be”: 3ª p. s. – 3. Question words: what, where, who. – 4. Present Progressive: 3ª p.s. – 5. How to ask for someone’s name. – 6. How to ask someone to spell a word. – 7. How to ask where someone lives. – z. Lessico e fraseologia.

§ 2°GB: Sommario: 1. Yes/No Questions. – 2. Subiect Pronouns. – 3. Present Progressive (3ª p.s.). –

§ 3°GB:

§ 4°GB:

§ 5°GB:

§ 6°GB:

§ 7°GB:

§ 8°GB:

§ 9°GB:

§ 10°GB:

Audio Video Letture

§ 1°GBal:

Letture seriali

ls-a: Risoluzioni Onu

ls-b: Volantini manifestazione londinese del ... ed affini.

ls-c: Dipinti della National Gallery di Londra.
ls-d:

ls-a

Risoluzioni Onu

§ 1°GBls-a:Risoluzioni Onu

ls-b

Volantini manifestazione londinese del ... ed affini.

§ 1°GBls-b: Volantini manifestazione londinese del ... ed affini.

ls-c

Dipinti della National Gallery di Londra

§ 1°GBls-c: Dipinti della National Gallery di Londra.

Wordbook
91

Address, analyst, announcement, answer, April, armchair, August, bailout, birth, book, boy, brother, cat, chair, child, classroom, confidence, conversation, danger, date, daughter, defection, Dezember, desk, dog, door, election, euro, family, father, Febrary, Floor, Friday, girl, gramophone, hand, husband, idea, information, January, July, June, leadre, letter, magazine, man, March, May, minister, Monday, morning, mother, name, newspaper, notebook, November, number, October, opposition, outcomen parliament, party, parent, pen, pencil, phone, place, plan, pipe, question, road, record, referendum, seat, September, son, street, support, surname, student, table, teacher, today, train, vote, wife, window, woman, world, year, zone.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 10: Incarcerazione di Muhammad Srour.

2011-04-23T06:10:00.003-07:00

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Istruzioni per i naviganti:
1) Ad ogni paragrafo del rapporto corrisponde un post, dove si trova il testo originale, la traduzione italiana, apparati linguistici, l’iconografia ed un commentario che sarà redatto, sviluppato e aggiornato con il tempo.
2) Per avere un quadro d’insieme o il pdf originale si clicchi in alto a sinistra su Home o pdf. Cliccando su Index si accede direttamente all’Indice-sommario della sezione corrente. Viene progressivamente redatto un Indice Analitico per paragrafi; cliccando su “Precedente” o “Successivo” si passa da un paragrafo all’altro.
3) Per una panoramica ed un monitoraggio delle discussioni sul Rapporto e sulla sua presunta ritrattazione o ventilato ritiro si rinvia alla Recensione edita in “Civium Libertas”.
4) Quanti desiderino acquistare il volume edito da Zambon trovano nella pagina Home tutte le indicazioni necessarie.

Sommario Esecutivo

A.
Introduzione

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Incarcerazione di Muhammad Srour

10. Subsequent to the public hearings in Geneva, the Mission was informed that a Palestinian participant, Mr. Muhammad Srour, had been detained by Israeli security forces when returning to the West Bank and became concerned that his detention may have been a consequence of his appearance before the Mission. The Mission is in contact with him and continues to monitor developments.

Traduzione italiana:

10. Successivamente alle audizioni pubbliche di Ginevra, la Missione è stata informata che un testimone palestinese che vi aveva partecipato, Muhammad Srour, era stato incarcerato dalle forze di sicurezza israeliane mentre rientrava in Cisgiordania. La Missione ha espresso il timore che la detenzione dell’uomo potesse essere una conseguenza della sua apparizione di fronte alla Missione. La Missione è in contatto con Muhammad Srour [e] continua a monitorare gli sviluppi della situazione.

Note e links:

1) Al nome di Muhammad Srour il motore di ricerca restituisce un collegamento all’Archivio storico del Corriere della Sera, dove si trova un articolo di tal Gergolet Mara del 6 dicembre 2006, relativo alla guerra allora sferrata da Israele contro il Libano e terminata con una sconfitta dell’attaccante. Gli Hezbollah dimostrarono allora di sapersi difendere. Basta questo, cioè volersi difendere e saper resistere con efficacia, per diventare “criminali” secondo il modo di ragionare sionista o israeliano che dir si voglia. Nell’articolo viene fatto, dunque, il nome di Muhammad Sroud come di un “combattente di Hezbollah catturato”. Potrebbe trattarsi di una omonimia. Andrebbero svolte e sviluppate considerazioni sull’articolo del Corriere della Sera, una testata chiaramente “di parte” e quasi sempre se non sempre sbilanciata dalla parte di Israele. Possiamo applicare al “Corriere della Sera” – con maggior fondamento – le critiche che Israele ha mosso e muove al rapporto Goldstone, cioè di essere “di parte”. Addirittura, si può trovare nell’archivio del Manifesto, la notizia di un ambasciatore israeliano che teneva un “seminario” o qualcosa di simile nella redazione stessa del “Corriere della Sera”. Se occorre farò la ricerca di questo articolo di cui ben ricordo e su cui si è discusso. Rinvio ancora a considerazione già fatte riguardo al concetto di “popolazione civile” nelle condizioni odierne della guerra, dove oggetto non sono più ormai dei soldati o combattenti muniti di divisa o di appositi contrassegni, ma direttamente le popolazione stesse in un disegno genocida che è malamente occultato. La filologia può essere una grande risorsa per denudare i costrutti della propaganda di guerra. Resta comunque il fatto che chiunque può rendere testimonianza in sede processuale, se perfino un Totò Riina può rendere dichiarazioni che hanno conseguenze per soggetti terzi. Resta ancora singolare che Israele vada a sottrarre testimoni ad una inchiesta in corso come quella della Missione ONU.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 9: Mancata collaborazione da parte del governo israeliano .

2011-04-23T06:10:00.001-07:00

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Istruzioni per i naviganti:
1) Ad ogni paragrafo del rapporto corrisponde un post, dove si trova il testo originale, la traduzione italiana, l’iconografia ed un commentario che sarà redatto, sviluppato e aggiornato con il tempo.
2) Per avere un quadro d’insieme o il pdf originale si clicchi in alto a sinistra su Home o pdf. Cliccando su Index si accede direttamente all’Indice-sommario della sezione corrente. Viene progressivamente redatto un Indice Analitico per paragrafi; cliccando su “Precedente” o “Successivo” si passa da un paragrafo all’altro.
3) Per una panoramica ed un monitoraggio delle discussioni sul Rapporto e sulla sua presunta ritrattazione o ventilato ritiro si rinvia alla Recensione edita in “Civium Libertas”.
4) Quanti desiderino acquistare il volume edito da Zambon trovano nella pagina Home tutte le indicazioni necessarie.

Sommario Esecutivo

A.
Introduzione

Home 8 ← § 9 → 10 Index

Mancata collaborazione da parte del governo israeliano

9. The Mission has enjoyed the support and cooperation of the Palestinian Authority and of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. Due to the lack of cooperation from the Israeli Government, the Mission was unable to meet members of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The Mission did, however, meet officials of the Palestinian Authority, including a cabinet minister, in Amman. During its visits to the Gaza Strip, the Mission held meetings with senior members of the Gaza authorities and they extended their full cooperation and support to the Mission.

Traduzione italiana:

9. La Missione ha goduto del supporto e della collaborazione dell’Autorità Palestinese e dell’Osservatore permanente della Palestina presso le Nazioni Unite. A causa della mancanza di collaborazione da parte del governo israeliano, la Missione non ha potuto incontrare i membri dell’Autorità Palestinese in Cisgiordania. La Missione è comunque riuscita a incontrare alcuni funzionari dell’Autorità Palestinese, tra cui un ministro, ad Amman. Durante le sue visite Striscia di Gaza la Missione ha tenuto incontri con alti esponenti della autorità di Gaza, che hanno offerto la massima collaborazione e il massimo supporto alla Missione.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 8: Accesso alla Striscia attraverso il valico di Rafah.

2011-04-23T06:09:00.003-07:00

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Sommario Esecutivo

A.
Introduzione

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Accesso alla Striscia attraverso il valico di Rafah

8. The Mission repeatedly sought to obtain the cooperation of the Government of Israel. After numerous attempts had failed, the Mission sought and obtained the assistance of the Government of Egypt to enable it to enter the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing.

Traduzione italiana:

8. La Missione ha ripetutamente cercato di ottenere la collaborazione del governo di Israele ma, dopo numerosi tentativi falliti, ha chiesto e ottenuto la collaborazione del governo egiziano per potere accedere alla Striscia di Gaza attraverso il valico di Rafah.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 7: Audizioni pubbliche in Gaza e a Ginevra.

2011-04-23T06:09:00.001-07:00

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Sommario Esecutivo

A.
Introduzione

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Audizioni pubbliche in Gaza e a Ginevra

7. Public hearings were held in Gaza on 28 and 29 June and in Geneva on 6 and 7 July 2009.

Traduzione italiana:

7. La Missione ha tenuto audizioni pubbliche a Gaza il 28 e 29 giugno, e a Ginevra il 6 e 7 luglio 2009.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 6: Invio di note verbali agli Stati. .

2011-04-23T06:08:00.000-07:00

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Introduzione

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Invio di note verbali agli Stati

6. Notes verbales were sent to all Member States of the United Nations and United Nations organs and bodies on 7 May 2009. On 8 June 2009 the Mission issued a call for submissions inviting all interested persons and organizations to submit relevant information and documentation to assist in the implementation of its mandate.

Traduzione italiana:

6. La Missione ha inviato note verbali a tutti gli Stati membri delle Nazioni Unite e agli organi ed enti delle Nazioni Unite il 7 maggio 2009. L’8 giugno 2009 la Missione ha contattato tutte le persone e le organizzazioni interessate, invitandole a supportare l’attuazione del mandato con l’invio di informazioni e documentazione in loro possesso.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 5: Riunioni e visite.

2011-04-23T06:05:00.000-07:00

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Sommario Esecutivo

A.
Introduzione

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Riunioni e visite

5. The Mission convened for the first time in Geneva between 4 and 8 May 2009. Additionally, the Mission met in Geneva on 20 May, on 4 and 5 July, and between 1 and 4 August 2009. The Mission conducted three field visits: two to the Gaza Strip between 30 May and 6 June, and between 25 June and 1 July 2009; and one visit to Amman on 2 and 3 July 2009. Several staff of the Mission’s secretariat were deployed in Gaza from 22 May to 4 July 2009 to conduct field investigations.

Traduzione italiana:

5. La Missione si è riunita per la prima volta a Ginevra tra il 4 e l’8 maggio 2009. Si è nuovamente riunita a Ginevra il 20 maggio, il 4 e 5 luglio, e tra l’1 e il 4 agosto 2009. La Missione ha effettuato tre visite sul campo: due nella Striscia di Gaza tra il 30 maggio e il 6 giugno e tra il 25 giugno e il 1 luglio, e una ad Amman il 2 e 3 luglio 2009. Diversi membri della segreteria della Missione sono stati impegnati a Gaza per lo svolgimento di indagini sul campo, dal 22 maggio al 4 luglio 2009.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 4: La popolazione civile.

2011-04-22T16:05:00.000-07:00

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Sommario Esecutivo

A.
Introduzione

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La popolazione civile

4. The Mission interpreted the mandate as requiring it to place the civilian population of the region at the centre of its concerns regarding the violations of international law.

Traduzione italiana:

4. La Missione ha svolto il proprio mandato in modo da mettere la popolazione civile della regione al centro delle proprie preoccupazioni in ordine alle violazioni del diritto internazionale.

Nostro Commento:

La nozione di “popolazione civile” risente, a nostro avviso, di una vecchia stratificazione del linguaggio giuridico. Un tempo era normale concepire le guerre come condotti da eserciti in divisa che si affrontavano in campo aperto, possibilmente lontano dalle città, dove per questo la “popolazione civile” non poteva essere messa in pericolo. Esistono in commercio riproduzioni in scala ridotta, ma assai fedeli agli originali, di soldatini di piombo o di plastica dei diversi eserciti della storia. Ci si diverte come in una gioco di scacchi a disporre gli eserciti su fronti contrapposti. Il gioco cambia del tutto quando la guerra si conduce non più contro eserciti in divisa, ma contro intere popolazioni, contro etnie che si intende sterminare con armi sempre più sofisticate, addirittura son sistemi genetici che consentono di distinguere una etnia dall’altra. Il “genocidio” fisico o culturale è il reale scopo delle guerre combattute dopo la guerra mondiale. La nuova epoca inizia con Hiroshima e Nagasaki, erroneamente collocate dagli storici a termine della Seconda guerra mondiale. Sono invece l’inizio di una Terza guerra mondiale che continua fino ad oggi e la cui posta è il dominio mondiale sotto una sola potenza.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 3: Segreteria.

2011-04-22T12:54:00.001-07:00

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Esecutivo Sommario

A.
Introduzione

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Segreteria

3. As is usual practice, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established a secretariat to support the Mission.

Traduzione italiana

3. Come è prassi, l’Alto commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i diritti umani ha istituito una segreteria di supporto alla Missione.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 2: Nomina del Capo della Missione e degli altri Membri designati.

2011-04-22T09:50:00.000-07:00

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Sommario Esecutivo

A.
Introduzione

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Nomina del Capo della Missione e degli altri Membri

2. The President appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were: Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun (2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations.

• Didascalia dell’immagine contenuta nel § 2. Nell’ordine: Hina Jilani, Richard Goldstone, Christine Chinkin, Desmond Travers.

Traduzione italiana:

2. Il presidente ha nominato a capo della Missione Richard Goldstone, già giudice della Corte costituzionale del Sud Africa e già pubblico ministero del Tribunale penale internazionale per l’ex Iugoslavia e il Rwanda. Gli altri membri designati erano: la professoressa Christine Chinkin, docente di Diritto internazionale alla London School of Economics and Political Science e già membro dell'Alta commissione d'inchiesta a Beit Hanoun nel 2008; Hina Jilani, avvocato della Corte suprema del Pakistan, già rappresentante speciale del segretario generale sulla situazione dei difensori dei diritti umani e membro della Commissione internazionale d’inchiesta in Darfur nel 2004; il colonnello Desmond Travers, ex ufficiale delle forze di difesa irlandesi e membro del consiglio di amministrazione dell'Institute for International Criminal Investigations.

NOTE, LINKS E COMMENTI

1) Gli effettivi estensori del rapporto. – Riporto da Bocche Scucite il seguente brano:

«I 3 membri che hanno redatto il rapporto su ‘Piombo Fuso’ sono: Hina Jilani, avvocato pachistano per i diritti umani; Christine Chinkin, professore di diritto internazionale alla London School of Economics; Desmond Travers, irlandese attivo nel processo di pace in Irlanda»,

rinviando per il resto al link, cui si accede cliccando sul titolo del paragrafo. Se – come si capisce alla lettera – non è stato materialmente Goldstone a scrivere il rapporto che porta il suo nome, ma gli altri tre Componenti la Commissione, si spiega all’origine come l’«ebreo» e «sionista» Goldstone abbia potuto accettare le conclusioni del rapporto e come alla fine si sia potuto giungere alla “ritrattazione” di conclusioni che era non opera usa, ma il risultato di una decisione collegiale. Naturalmente, gli effettivi estensori del Rapporto non ritrattano nulla e respingono le “ritrattazioni” di Goldstone, che diventa ora un nuovo interessante capitolo della secolare storia di maneggi, inganni e ricatti del sionismo. Certamente, una vicenda che vale la pena di ricostruire nei limiti del possibile.

2) Goldstone accusato dai suoi colleghi: “La sua ritrattazione solo per pressioni politiche”. – L’articolo, in italiano, è abbastanza ampio. Vi si accusa Goldstone di mistificazione dei fatti per instillare dubbi sulla credibilità di tutta la Commissione. Del resto, nelle notizie finora lette, Goldstone parla a suo nome e non menziona per nulla il giudizio degli altri tre Commissari che non erano delle semplici comparse o degli uscieri. In un Collegio, normalmente, tutti i membri hanno eguali dignità giuridica e la funzione di un Presidente è quella di un Portavoce, quasi di un Segretario che parla a nome di tutto il Collegio e ne assume la rappresentanza all’esterno in modo che il Collegio stesso parli con una sola voce. È un comportamento poco giuridico quello di Goldstone: chiunque abbia mai fatto parte di un “collegio” sa queste cose. In realtà, come osserva John Dugard:

«Goldstone, contrariamente ai suoi critici, non descrive il suo articolo come una ritrattazione del rapporto Goldstone. Questo non sorprende. Goldstone è un ex giudice e sa benissimo che un Rapporto Conoscitivo redatto da quattro persone, di cui egli era soltanto una, al pari della sentenza di un tribunale, non può essere modificato dalle riflessioni successive di un singolo membro della commissione» (Fonte).

È curiosa e sospetta l’attenzione morbosa della stampa, di una certa stampa, e soprattutto della propaganda israeliana, sulle presunte ritrattazioni del Presidente, totalmente sganciate dal Collegio di cui faceva parte senza essere il “capo” gerarchico, il padrone solo in grado di decidere e di assumere la titolarità de rapporto. Gli elementi addotti da Goldstone sono davvero marginali e risibili davanti a tutto lo spettro di indagine che si presentava al lavoro della Missione. La frase di Gondstone sempre riportata è la seguente:

«Se avessi saputo allora ciò che so adesso, il Rapporto Goldstone sarebbe un documento diverso».

Già, ma cosa sa egli adesso? Io penso che il rapporto Goldstone avrebbe potuto essere ben più pesante per Israele di quanto non sia stato, se a presierlo non vi fosse stato un “ebreo” e un “sionista”, cosa che non avrebbe dovuto mai essere. E comunque alla dichiarazione di Goldstone ben si contrappone la dichiarazione degli altri tre membri:

«Se avessimo ceduto alle pressioni che ci chiedevano di ritoccare le nostre conclusioni avremmo commesso una vera ingiustizia nei confronti delle centinaia di civili innocenti uccisi durante il conflitto di Gaza, alle migliaia di feriti, alle centinaia di migliaia di persone la cui vita è tutt’ora colpita dal conflitto e dall’embargo».

Anche qui sarebbe istruttivo conoscere nei dettagli da parte di chi e di quale tenore siano state le “pressioni”, che la Commissione ha fronteggiato ed alle quali post factum Goldstone ha ceduto.

3) Ma quali fatti nuovi mettono in dubbio il rapporto Goldstone? – Il link rinvia ad un’ampia analisi contenuta su un blog (“Palestina libera!") di analoga piattaforma alla nostra. Esaurienti le argomentazioni per illustrare come si basino sul nulla i motivi che avrebbero fatto ricredere Goldstone sull’attendibilità del rapporto omonimo, per il quale egli si limita in fondo a dire che “sarebbe stato diverso”. Io credo in peggio, se a presiederlo non fosse stato lui, cioè un presidente che si sarebbe potuto fondatamente ricusare in quanto “sionista”. Non va dimenticato l’equiparazione fra sionismo e razzismo fatta nel 2001 da un precedente Consiglio sui diritti umani. Quella dichiarazione fu poi ritirata e la storia di quel ritiro, i suoi passaggi, i suoi attori, diventa adesso estremamente interessanti per gli atti prodromici che chiaramente tendono a ripetere quei maneggi.

Rapporto Goldstone: E. S. Cb.: The Occupied Palestinian Territory: 18. Restriction on freedom of movement in the West Bank - §§ 92-96.

2009-11-09T10:06:00.000-08:00

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Executive Summary
C.
b. The Occupied Palestinian Territory: the West Bank, including East Jerusalem
18.
Restrictions on freedom of movement in the West Bank

§§: 92 - 93 - 94 - 95 - 96 -

92. In the West Bank, Israel has long imposed a system of movement restrictions. Movement is restricted by a combination of physical obstacles such as roadblocks, checkpoints and the Wall, but also through administrative measures such as identity cards, permits, assigned residence, laws on family reunification, and policies on the right to enter from abroad and the right of return for refugees. Palestinians are denied access to areas expropriated for the building of the Wall and its infrastructure, for use by settlements, buffer zones, military bases and military training zones, and the roads built to connect these places. Many of these roads are “Israeli only” and forbidden for Palestinian use. Tens of thousands of Palestinians today are subject to a “travel ban” imposed by Israel, preventing them from travelling abroad. A number of witnesses and experts invited by the Mission to meet in Amman and participate in the hearings in Geneva could not meet with the Mission due to this travel ban.

93. The Mission has received reports that, during the Israeli offensive in Gaza, movement restrictions in the West Bank were tightened. Israel imposed a “closure” on the West Bank for several days. Additionally there were a greater number of checkpoints in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, for the duration of the operation. Most of these were so-called “flying” checkpoints. In January 2009, several areas of the West Bank between the Wall and the Green line were declared “closed military areas”.

94. During and following the operations in Gaza, Israel deepened its hold on the West Bank through an increased level of expropriation, an increased number of house demolitions, demolition orders and of permits granted for homes built in settlements, and increased exploitation of the natural resources in the West Bank. Following the operations in Gaza, Israel has amended the regulations which determine the ability of persons with “Gaza ID” to move to the West Bank, and vice versa, further entrenching the separation between the people of the West Bank and Gaza.

95. Israel’s Ministry of Housing and Planning is planning a further 73,000 settlement homes to be built in the West Bank. The building of 15,000 of these homes has already been approved, and, if all the plans are realized, the number of settlers in the occupied Palestinian territory will be doubled.

96. The Mission believes that the movement and access restrictions to which West Bank Palestinians are subject are disproportionate to any military objective served, in general, and more so in relation to the increased restrictions during and to some extent after the military operation in Gaza. In addition, the Mission is concerned about the steps taken recently to formalise the separation between Gaza and the West Bank, and as such between two parts of the OPT.

Rapporto Goldstone: E. S. Cb.: The Occupied Palestinian Territory: 17. Detention of Palestinians in Israeli prisons - §§ 86-91.

2009-11-08T02:43:00.001-08:00

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b. The Occupied Palestinian Territory: the West Bank, including East Jerusalem
17.
Detention of Palestinians in Israeli prisons

§§: 86 - 87 - 88 - 89 - 90 - 91 -

86. It is estimated that since the beginning of the occupation, approximately 700,000 Palestinian men, women and children have been detained by Israel. According to estimates, as at 1st June 2009, there were approximately 8,100 Palestinian ‘political prisoners’ in detention in Israel, including 60 women and 390 children. Most of these detainees are charged or convicted by the Israeli Military Court System that operates for Palestinians in the West Bank and under which due process rights for Palestinians are severely limited. Many are held in administrative detention, and some under the Israeli “Unlawful Combatants Law”.

87. The Mission focussed on a number of issues in relation to Palestinian detainees that in its view are linked to the December-January Israeli military operations in Gaza or their context.

88. Legal measures since Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005 have resulted in differential treatment for Gazan detainees. A 2006 law altered due process guarantees, and is applied only to Palestinian suspects, the overwhelming majority of whom are from Gaza according to Israeli government sources. The ICRC Family Visits Programme in the Gaza Strip was suspended in 2007, barring all means of communication between Gazan prisoners and the outside world.

89. During the Israeli military operations in Gaza, the number of children detained by Israel increased compared to the same period in 2008. Many children were reportedly arrested on the street and/or during demonstrations in the West Bank during the Gaza operations. Numbers of child detainees continued to be high in the months following the end of the operations, accompanied by reports of abuses by Israeli security forces.

90. A feature of Israel’s detention practice vis-à-vis the Palestinians since 2005 has been the arrest of persons affiliated with Hamas. A few months before the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections in 2005, Israel arrested numerous persons who had been involved in municipal or PLC elections. Following the capture by Palestinian armed groups of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006, the Israeli army arrested some 65 members of the PLC, Mayors and Ministers, mostly Hamas members. All were held at least two years, generally in inadequate conditions . Further arrests of Hamas leaders were conducted during the Gaza military operations. The detention of the PLC members has meant that the PLC has been unable to function and exercise its legislative and oversight function over the Palestinian executive.

91. The Mission finds that these practices have resulted in violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the right to equal protection under the law and not to be discriminated based on political beliefs and the special protections to which children are entitled. The Mission also finds that the detention of PLC members may amount to collective punishment contrary to international humanitarian law.

Rapporto Goldstone: E. S. Cb.: The Occupied Palestinian Territory: the West Bank, including East Jerusalem - § 81-85.

2009-11-07T04:34:00.001-08:00

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b. The Occupied Palestinian Territory: the West Bank, including East Jerusalem

§: 81 - 82 - Cb16: 83 - 84 - 85.

81. The Mission considered developments in Gaza and the West Bank as closely interrelated, and analysed both to reach an informed understanding of and to report on issues within the Mission’s mandate.

82. The A consequence of Israel’s non-cooperation with the Mission was that the Mission was unable to visit the West Bank to investigate alleged violations of international law there. However, the Mission has received many oral and written reports and other relevant materials from Palestinian, Israeli and international human rights organizations and institutions. In addition, the Mission has met with representatives of human rights organizations, members of the Palestinian legislature and community leaders. It heard experts, witnesses and victims in the public hearings, interviewed affected individuals and witnesses and reviewed video and photographic material.

16.

Treatment of Palestinians by Israeli security forces in the West Bank, including use of excessive or lethal force during demonstrations

83. The Various witnesses and experts informed the Mission of a sharp increase in the use of force by the Israeli security forces against Palestinians in the West Bank from the commencement of the Israeli operations in Gaza (Chapter XIX). A number of protestors were killed by Israeli forces during Palestinian demonstrations, including in support of the Gaza population under attack, following the beginning of the operations, and scores were injured. The level of violence employed in the West Bank during the time of the operation in Gaza, was sustained also after the
end of the operation.

84. The Of particular concern to the Mission were allegations of the use of unnecessary, lethal force by Israeli security forces, the use of live ammunitions, and the provision in the Israeli armed forces “open fire regulations” of different rules to deal with disturbances where only Palestinians are present, as compared to disturbances where Israelis are present. This raises serious concern with regard to discriminatory policies vis-à-vis Palestinians. Eye-witnesses also reported to the Mission the use of sniper fire in the context of crowd control. Witnesses spoke of the markedly different atmosphere they encountered in the confrontation with the soldiers and border police during demonstrations in which all checks and balances had been removed. Several witnesses told the Mission that during the operation in Gaza, the sense in the West Bank was one of a “free
for all”, where anything was permitted.

85. The Little if any action is taken by Israeli authorities to investigate, prosecute and punish violence against Palestinians by settlers and members of security forces, including killings, resulting in a situation of impunity. The Mission concludes that Israel has failed to fulfil its obligations to protect the Palestinians from violence by private individuals under both international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary Ca.: 15. Internal violence and targeting of Fathe affiliates by security services under the control of the Gaza authorities. - § 79-80

2009-10-18T11:54:00.000-07:00

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a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
15.
Internal violence and targeting of Fateh affiliates by security services under the control of the Gaza authorities

§§: 79 - 80 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno. Chi vuole subito tutto il testo originale del rapporto deve cliccare sopra su pdf. Un indice analitico dei §§ lo si trova qui.

79. The Mission obtained information about violence against political opponents by the security services that report to the Gaza authorities. These included killing of a number of Gaza residents between the beginning of the Israeli military operations and 27 February. Among these were some detainees who had been at al-Saraya detention facility on 28 December, and who had fled following the Israeli aerial attack. Not all those killed after escaping detention were Fatah affiliates, detained for political reasons, or charged with collaborating with the enemy. Some of the escapees had been convicted of serious crimes, such as drug-dealing or murder, and had been sentenced to death. The Mission was informed that the movement of many Fatah members was restricted during Israel’s military operations in Gaza and that many were put under house arrest. According to the Gaza authorities, arrests were made only after the end of the Israeli military operations and only in relation to criminal acts and to restore public order.

80. The Mission gathered first-hand information on five cases of Fatah affiliates detained, killed or subject to physical abuse by members of security forces or armed groups in Gaza. In most cases those abducted from their homes or otherwise detained were reportedly not accused of offences related to specific incidents, but rather targeted because of their political affiliation. When charges were laid, these were always linked to suspected political activities. The testimonies of witnesses and the reports provided by international and domestic human rights organizations bear striking similarities and indicate that these attacks were not randomly executed, but constituted part of a pattern of organized violence directed mainly against Fatah affiliates and supporters. The Mission finds that such actions constitute serious violations of human rights and are not consistent with either the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Palestinian Basic Law.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary Ca.: 14. The continuing detention of Israeli Giald Shalit - § 76-78

2009-10-17T06:17:00.000-07:00

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a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
14.
The continuing detention of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit

§§: 76 - 77 - 78 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno. Chi vuole subito tutto il testo originale del rapporto deve cliccare sopra su pdf. Un indice analitico dei §§ lo si trova qui.

76. The Mission notes the continued detention of Gilad Shalit, a member of the Israeli armed forces, captured in 2006 by a Palestinian armed group. In reaction to his capture, the Israeli Government ordered a number of attacks against infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and Palestinian Authority offices as well as the arrest of eight Palestinian Government ministers and 26 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. The Mission heard testimonies indicating that during the military operations of December 2008 – January 2009, Israeli soldiers questioned captured Palestinians about the whereabouts of Gilad Shalit. Gilad Shalit’s father, Noam Shalit, appeared before the Mission at the public hearing held in Geneva on 6 July 2009.

77. The Mission is of the opinion that, as a soldier who belongs to the Israeli armed forces and who was captured during an enemy incursion into Israel, Gilad Shalit meets the requirements for prisoner-of-war status under the Third Geneva Convention. As such, he should be protected, treated humanely and be allowed external communication as appropriate according to that Convention. The ICRC should be allowed to visit him without delay. Information about his condition should also be provided promptly to his family.

78. The Mission is concerned by declarations made by various Israeli officials, who have indicated the intention of maintaining the blockade of the Gaza Strip until the release of Gilad Shalit. The Mission is of the opinion that this would constitute collective punishment of the civilian population of the Gaza Strip.

Rapporto Goldstone: E. S. Ca.: 13. The impact of the military operations and the blockade on the Gaza population and their human rights - § 65-75

2009-10-16T22:44:00.000-07:00

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13.
The impact of the military operations and the blockade on the Gaza population and their human rights

§§: 65 - 66 - 67 - 68 - 69 - 70 - 71 - 72 - 73 - 74 - 75 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno. Chi vuole subito tutto il testo originale del rapporto deve cliccare sopra su pdf. Un indice analitico dei §§ lo si trova qui.

65. The Mission examined the combined impact of the military operations and of the blockade on the Gaza population and its enjoyment of human rights. The economy, employment opportunities and family livelihoods were already severely affected by the blockade when the Israeli offensive began. Insufficient supply of fuel for electricity generation had a negative impact on industrial activity, on the operation of hospitals, on water supply to households and on sewage treatment. Import restrictions and the ban on all exports from Gaza affected the industrial sector and agricultural production. Unemployment levels and the percentage of the population living in poverty and deep poverty were rising.

66. In this precarious situation, the military operations destroyed a substantial part of the economic infrastructure. As a large part of the factories were targeted and destroyed or damaged, poverty, unemployment and food insecurity further increased dramatically. The agricultural sector similarly suffered due to the destruction of agricultural land, water wells and fishing boats during the military operations. The continuation of the blockade impedes the reconstruction of the economic infrastructure destroyed.

67. As a result of the razing of farmland and destruction of greenhouses, food insecurity is expected to further worsen in spite of the increased quantities of food items allowed into Gaza since the beginning of the military operations. Dependence on food assistance increases. Levels of stunting and thinness in children and of anaemia prevalence in children and pregnant women were worrying already before the military operations. The hardship caused by the extensive destruction of shelter (UNDP reported 3,354 houses completely destroyed and 11,112 partially damaged) and resulting displacement particularly affects children and women. In the water and sanitation sector, the destruction of infrastructure (such as the destruction of the Namar wells and the attack against the water treatment plant described in Chapter XIII), aggravated the preexisting situation. Already before the military operations, 80 percent of the water supplied in Gaza did not meet the WHO’s standards for drinking water. The discharge of untreated or partially treated waste water into the sea is a further health hazard worsened by the military operations.

68. The military operations and resulting casualties subjected the beleaguered Gaza health sector to additional strain. Hospitals and ambulances were targeted by Israeli attacks. Patients with chronic health conditions could not be given priority in hospitals faced with the influx of patients with life-threatening injuries. Patients with hostilities-related injuries had often to be discharged as early as possible to free beds. The long term health impact of these early discharges, as well as of weapons containing substances such as tungsten and white phosphorous, remains a source of concern. While the exact number of people who will suffer permanent disabilities is still unknown, the Mission understands that many persons who sustained traumatic injuries during the conflict still face the risk of permanent disability due to complications and inadequate follow-up and physical rehabilitation.

69. The number of persons suffering from mental health problems is also bound to increase. The Mission investigated a number of incidents in which adults and children witnessed the killing of their loved ones. Doctors of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme gave information to the Mission on psychosomatic disorders, on a widespread state of alienation in the population, and on “numbness” as a result of severe loss. They told the Mission that these conditions were likely to in turn increase the readiness to embrace violence and extremism. They also told the Mission that 20 percent of children in the Gaza Strip suffer Post Traumatic Stress Disorders.

70. Children’s learning difficulties of psychological origin are compounded by the impact of the blockade and the military operations on the education infrastructure. 280 schools and kindergartens were destroyed in a situation in which already restrictions on the importation of construction materials meant that many school buildings were in serious need of repair.

71. The Mission’s attention was also drawn to the particular manner in which women were affected by the military operations. The cases of women interviewed by the Mission in Gaza dramatically illustrate the suffering resulting from the feeling of inability to provide children with the care and security they need. Women’s responsibility for the household and the children often forces them to conceal their own sufferings, resulting in their issues remaining unaddressed. The number of women who are sole breadwinners increased, but their employment opportunities remain significantly inferior to men’s. The military operations and increased poverty add to the potential for conflicts in the family and among widowed women and their inlaws.

72. The Mission acknowledges that the supply of humanitarian goods, particularly foodstuffs, allowed into Gaza by Israel temporarily increased during the military operations. The level of goods allowed into Gaza before the military operations, however, was insufficient to meet the needs of the population even before hostilities started, and has again decreased after the end of the military operations. From the facts ascertained by it, the Mission believes that Israel has violated its obligation to allow free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital objects, food and clothing (article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). The Mission also finds that Israel violated specific obligations it has as Occupying Power spelled out in the Fourth Geneva Convention, such as the duty to maintain medical and hospital establishments and services and to agree to relief schemes if the occupied territory is not well supplied.

73. The Mission also concludes that in the destruction by Israeli armed forces of private residential houses, water wells, water tanks, agricultural land and greenhouses there was a specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance to the population of the Gaza Strip. The Mission finds that Israel violated its duty to respect the right of the Gaza population to an adequate standard of living, including access to adequate food, water and housing. The Mission moreover finds violations of specific human rights provisions protecting the rights of children, particularly those who are victims of armed conflict, women and the disabled.

74. The conditions of life in Gaza, resulting from deliberate actions of the Israeli forces and the declared policies of the Government of Israel – as they were presented by its authorized and legitimate representatives - with regard to the Gaza Strip before, during and after the military operation, cumulatively indicate the intention to inflict collective punishment on the people of the Gaza Strip in violation of international humanitarian law.

75. Finally, the Mission considered whether the series of acts that deprive Palestinians in the Gaza Strip of their means of sustenance, employment, housing and water, that deny their freedom of movement and their right to leave and enter their own country, that limit their access a court of law and an effective remedy, could amount to persecution, a crime against humanity. From the facts available to it, the Mission is of the view that some of the actions of the Government of Israel might justify a competent court finding that crimes against humanity have
been committed.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary Ca.: 12. Objectives and strategy of Israeli’s military operations in Gaza - § 61-64

2009-10-15T08:31:00.000-07:00

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a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
12.
Objectives and strategy of Israeli’s military operations in Gaza

§§: 61 - 62 - 63 - 64 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno. Chi vuole subito tutto il testo originale del rapporto deve cliccare sopra su pdf. Un indice analitico dei §§ lo si trova qui.

61. The Mission reviewed available information on the planning of the Israeli military operations in Gaza, on the advanced military technology available to the Israeli forces and on their training in international humanitarian law (Chapter XVI). According to official Government information, the Israeli armed forces have an elaborate legal advice and training system in place, which seeks to ensure knowledge of the relevant legal obligations and support to commanders for compliance in the field. The Israeli armed forces possess very advanced hardware and are also a market leader in the production of some of the most advanced pieces of military technology available, including UAVs. They have a very significant capacity for precision strikes by a variety of methods, including aerial and ground launches. Taking into account the ability to plan, the means to execute plans with the most developed technology available, and statements by the Israeli military that almost no errors occurred, the Mission finds that the incidents and patterns of events considered in the report are the result of deliberate planning and policy decisions.

62. The tactics used by Israeli military armed forces in the Gaza offensive are consistent with previous practices, most recently during the Lebanon war in 2006. A concept known as the Dahiya doctrine emerged then, involving the application of disproportionate force and the causing of great damage and destruction to civilian property and infrastructure, and suffering to civilian populations. The Mission concludes from a review of the facts on the ground that it witnessed for itself that what was prescribed as the best strategy appears to have been precisely what was put into practice.

Links:
1. La strategia della Dahiya.

63. In the framing of Israeli military objectives with regard to the Gaza operations, the concept of Hamas’ “supporting infrastructure” is particularly worrying as it appears to transform civilians and civilian objects into legitimate targets. Statements by Israeli political and military leaders prior to and during the military operations in Gaza indicate that the Israeli military conception of what was necessary in a war with Hamas viewed disproportionate destruction and creating the maximum disruption in the lives of many people as a legitimate means to achieve not only military but also political goals.

64. Statements by Israeli leaders to the effect that the destruction of civilian objects would be justified as a response to rocket attacks (“destroy 100 homes for every rocket fired”), indicate the possibility of resort to reprisals. The Mission is of the view that reprisals against civilians in armed hostilities are contrary to international humanitarian law.

Rapporto Goldstone: E.S. Ca.: 11. Deprivation of liberty: Gazans detained during the Israeli operation of 27 December 2008 to 18 January... - §§ 56-60

2009-10-15T07:51:00.000-07:00

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11.
Deprivation of liberty: Gazans detained during the Israeli operation of 27 December 2008 to January 2009

§§: 56 - 57 - 58 - 59 - 60 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno. Chi vuole subito tutto il testo originale del rapporto deve cliccare sopra su pdf. Un indice analitico dei §§ lo si trova qui.

56. During the military operations Israeli armed forces rounded up large numbers of civilians and detained them in houses and open spaces in Gaza and, in the case of many Palestinian men, also took them to detention facilities in Israel. In the cases investigated by the Mission, the facts gathered indicate that none of the civilians were armed or posed any apparent threat to the Israeli soldiers. Chapter XV of the report is based on the Mission’s interviews with Palestinian men who were detained, as well as on the Mission’s review of other relevant material, including interviews with relatives and statements from other victims submitted to the Mission.

57. From the facts gathered, the Mission finds that there were numerous violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law committed in the context of these detentions. Civilians, including women and children, were detained in degrading conditions, deprived of food, water and access to sanitary facilities, and exposed to the elements in January without any shelter. The men were handcuffed, blindfolded and repeatedly made to strip, sometimes naked, at different stages of their detention.

58. In the Al Atatra area in north-western Gaza Israeli troops had dug out sand pits in which Palestinian men, women and children were detained. Israeli tanks and artillery positions were located inside the sand pits and around them and fired from next to the detainees.

59. The Palestinian men who were taken to detention facilities in Israel were subjected to degrading conditions of detention, harsh interrogation, beatings and other physical and mental abuse. Some of them were charged with being unlawful combatants. Those interviewed by the Mission were released after the proceedings against them had apparently been discontinued.

60. In addition to arbitrary deprivation of liberty and violation of due process rights, the cases of the detained Palestinian civilians highlight a common thread of the interaction between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians which emerged clearly also in many cases discussed in other parts of the Report: continuous and systematic abuse, outrages on personal dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment contrary to fundamental principles of international humanitarian law and human rights law. The Mission concludes that the treatment of these civilians constitutes the infliction of a collective penalty on those persons and amounts to measures of intimidation and terror. Such acts are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and constitute a war crime.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary Ca.: 10. The use of Palestinian civilians as human shields - § 55

2009-10-14T09:21:00.000-07:00

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10.
The use of Palestinian civilians as human shields

§§: 55 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno. Chi vuole subito tutto il testo originale del rapporto deve cliccare sopra su pdf. Un indice analitico dei §§ lo si trova qui.

55. The Mission investigated four incidents in which Israeli forces coerced Palestinian civilian men at gun point to take part in house searches during the military operations (Chapter XIV). The Palestinian men were blindfolded and handcuffed as they were forced to enter houses ahead of the Israeli soldiers. In one of the incidents, Israeli forces repeatedly forced a man to enter a house in which Palestinian combatants were hiding. Published testimonies of Israeli soldiers who took part in the military operations confirm the continued use of this practice, in spite of clear orders from Israel’s High Court to the armed forces to put an end to it and repeated public assurances from the armed forces that the practice had been discontinued. The Mission concludes that this practice amounts to the use of Palestinian civilians as human shields and is therefore prohibited by international humanitarian law. It puts the right to life of the civilians at risk in an arbitrary and unlawful manner and constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment. The use of human shields also is a war crime. The Palestinian men used as human shields were questioned under threat of death or injury to extract information about Hamas, Palestinian combatants and tunnels. This constitutes a further violation of international humanitarian law.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary Ca.: 9. Attacks on the fondation of civilian life in Gaza - §§ 50-54

2009-10-14T08:21:00.000-07:00

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C.
a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
9.
Attacks on the foundations of civilian life in Gaza: destruction of industrial infrastructure, food production, water intallations, sewage treatment and housing

§§: 50 - 51 - 52 - 53 - 54 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno. Chi vuole subito tutto il testo originale del rapporto deve cliccare sopra su pdf. Un indice analitico dei §§ lo si trova qui.

50. The Mission investigated several incidents involving the destruction of industrial infrastructure, food production, water installations, sewage treatment and housing (Chapter XIII). Already at the beginning of the military operations, the Al Bader flour mill was the only flour mill in the Gaza Strip still operating. The flour mill was hit by a series of air strikes on 9 January 2009 after several false warnings had been issued on previous days. The Mission finds that its destruction had no military justification. The nature of the strikes, in particular the precise targeting of crucial machinery, suggests that the intention was to disable the factory in terms of its productive capacity. From the facts it ascertained, the Mission finds that there has been a violation of the grave breaches provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Unlawful and wanton destruction which is not justified by military necessity amounts to a war crime. The Mission also finds that the destruction of the mill was carried out for the purposes of denying sustenance to the civilian population, which is a violation of customary international law and may constitute a war crime. The strike on the flour mill further constitutes a violation of human rights provisions regarding the right to adequate food and means of subsistence.

51. The chicken farms of Mr. Sameh Sawafeary in the Zeitoun neighbourhood south of Gaza City reportedly supplied over 10 per cent of the Gaza egg market. Armoured bulldozers of the Israeli forces systematically flattened the chicken coops, killing all 31,000 chickens inside, and destroyed the plant and material necessary for the business. The Mission concludes that this was a deliberate act of wanton destruction not justified by any military necessity and draws the same legal conclusions as in the case of the destruction of the flour mill.

52. Israeli forces also carried out a strike against a wall of one of the raw sewage lagoons of the Gaza Waste Water Treatment Plant, which caused the outflow of more than 200,000 cubic metres of raw sewage into neighbouring farmland. The circumstances of the strike on the lagoon suggest that it was deliberate and premeditated. The Namar Wells complex in Jabalya consisted of two water wells, pumping machines, a generator, fuel storage, a reservoir chlorination unit, buildings and related equipment. All were destroyed by multiple air strikes on the first day of the Israeli aerial attack. The Mission considers it unlikely that a target the size of the Namar Wells could have been hit by multiple strikes in error. It found no grounds to suggest that there was any military advantage to be had by hitting the wells and noted that there was no suggestion that Palestinian armed groups had used the wells for any purpose. Considering that the right to drinking water is part of the right to adequate food, the Mission makes the same legal findings as in the case of the Al Bader flour mill.

53. During its visits to the Gaza Strip, the Mission witnessed the extent of the destruction of residential housing caused by air strikes, mortar and artillery shelling, missile strikes, the operation of bulldozers and demolition charges. In some cases, residential neighbourhoods were subjected to air-launched bombing and to intensive shelling apparently in the context of the advance of Israeli ground forces. In other cases, the facts gathered by the Mission strongly suggest that the destruction of housing was carried out in the absence of any link to combat engagements with Palestinian armed groups or any other effective contribution to military action. Combining the results of its own fact finding on the ground with UNOSAT imagery and the published testimonies of Israeli soldiers, the Mission concludes that, in addition to the extensive destruction of housing for so-called “operational necessity” during their advance, the Israeli forces engaged in another wave of systematic destruction of civilian buildings during the last three days of their presence in Gaza, aware of the imminence of withdrawal. The conduct of the Israeli forces in this respect violated the principle of distinction between civilian and military objects and amounted to the grave breach of “extensive destruction … of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”. Israeli forces further violated the right to adequate housing of the families concerned.

54. The attacks on industrial facilities, food production and water infrastructure investigated by the Mission are part of a broader pattern of destruction, which includes the destruction of the only cement packaging plant in Gaza (the Atta Abu Jubbah plant), the Abu Eida factories for ready-mix concrete, further chicken farms and the Al Wadia Group’s foods and drinks factories. The facts ascertained by the Mission indicate that there was a deliberate and systematic policy on the part of the Israeli armed forces to target industrial sites and water installations.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary Ca.: 8. The use of certain weapons - §§ 48-49

2009-10-14T04:43:00.000-07:00

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C.
a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
8.
The use of certain weapons

§§: 48 - 49 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno. Chi vuole subito tutto il testo originale del rapporto deve cliccare sopra su pdf. Un indice analitico dei §§ lo si trova qui.

48. Based on its investigation of incidents involving the use of certain weapons such as white phosphorous and flechette missiles, the Mission, while accepting that white phosphorous is not at this stage proscribed under international law, finds that the Israeli armed forces were systematically reckless in determining its use in built-up areas. Moreover, doctors who treated patients with white phosphorous wounds spoke about the severity and sometimes untreatable nature of the burns caused by the substance. The Mission believes that serious consideration should be given to banning the use of white phosphorous in built-up areas. As to flechettes, the Mission notes that they are an area weapon incapable of discriminating between objectives after detonation. They are, therefore, particularly unsuitable for use in urban settings where there is reason to believe civilians may be present.

Links:
1. Danni da fosforo bianco, a Falluja come nella Striscia di Gaza.
2. Bombe al fosforo bianco a Gaza?
3. Cosa sono le flechettes. – Per chi non lo sapesse.

49. While the Mission is not in a position to state with certainty that so-called dense inert metal explosive (DIME) munitions were used by the Israeli armed forces, it did receive reports from Palestinian and foreign doctors who operated in Gaza during the military operations of a high percentage of patients with injuries compatible with their impact. DIME weapons and weapons armed with heavy metal are not prohibited under international law as it currently stands, but do raise specific health concerns. Finally, the Mission received allegations that depleted and nondepleted uranium were used by Israeli forces in Gaza. These allegations were not further investigated by the Mission.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary Ca.: 7. Deliberate attacks against the civilian population - §§ 43-47

2009-10-14T01:40:00.000-07:00

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a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
7.
Deliberate attacks against the civilian population

§§: 43 - 44 - 45 - 46 - 47 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno. Chi vuole subito tutto il testo originale del rapporto deve cliccare sopra su pdf.

43. The Mission investigated eleven incidents in which Israeli forces launched direct attacks against civilians with lethal outcome (Chapter XI). The cases examined in this part of the report are, with one exception, all cases in which the facts indicate no justifiable military objective pursued by the attack. The first two incidents are attacks against houses in the Samouni neighbourhood south of Gaza City, including the shelling of a house in which Palestinian civilians had been forced to assemble by the Israeli forces. The following group of seven incidents concern the shooting of civilians while they were trying to leave their homes to walk to a safer place, waving white flags and, in some of the cases, following an injunction from the Israeli forces to do so. The facts gathered by the Mission indicate that all the attacks occurred under circumstances in which the Israeli forces were in control of the area and had previously entered into contact with or at least observed the persons they subsequently attacked, so that they must have been aware of their civilian status. In the majority of these incidents, the consequences of the Israeli attacks against civilians were aggravated by their subsequent refusal to allow the evacuation of the wounded or to permit access to ambulances.

44. These incidents indicate that the instructions given to the Israeli forces moving into Gaza provided for a low threshold for the use of lethal fire against the civilian population. The Mission found strong corroboration of this trend emerging from its fact-finding in the testimonies of Israeli soldiers collected in two publications it reviewed.

45. The Mission further examined an incident in which a mosque was targeted with a missile during the early evening prayer, resulting in the death of fifteen, and an attack with flechette munitions on a crowd of family and neighbours at a condolence tent, killing five. The Mission finds that both attacks constitute intentional attacks against the civilian population and civilian objects.

46. From the facts ascertained in all the above cases, the Mission finds that the conduct of the Israeli armed forces constitute grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention in respect of wilful killings and wilfully causing great suffering to protected persons and as such give rise to individual criminal responsibility. It also finds that the direct targeting and arbitrary killing of Palestinian civilians is a violation of the right to life.

47. The last incident concerns the launch of a bomb on a house resulting in the killing of 22 family members. Israel’s position in this case is that there was an “operational error” and that the intended target was a neighbouring house storing weapons. On the basis of its investigation, the Mission expresses significant doubts about the Israeli authorities’ account of the incident. The Mission concludes that, if indeed a mistake was made, there could not be said to be a case of wilful killing. State responsibility of Israel for an internationally wrongful act, however, would remain.

Rapporto Goldstone: E. S. Ca.: 6. Indiscriminate attacks by Israeli forces resulting in the loss of life and injury to civilians - §§ 41-42

2009-10-13T05:24:00.000-07:00

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Executive Summary
C.
a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
6.
Obligation to take feasible precautions to protect civilian population and objects by Israel in Gaza

§§: 41 - 42 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno.

41. The Mission examined the mortar shelling of al-Fakhura junction in Jabalya next to a UNRWA school which at the time was used as a shelter housing more than 1,300 people (Chapter X). The Israeli forces launched at least four mortar shells. One landed in the courtyard of a family home, killing eleven people assembled there. Three other shells landed on al-Fakhura Street, killing at least a further 24 people and injuring as many as 40. The Mission examines in detail statements by Israeli Government representatives alleging that the attack was launched in response to a mortar attack from an armed Palestinian group. While the Mission does not exclude that this may have been the case, it considers the credibility of Israel’s position damaged by the series of inconsistencies, contradictions and factual inaccuracies in the statements justifying the attack.

42. In drawing its legal conclusions on the attack against al-Fakhura junction, the Mission recognizes that for all armies proportionality decisions, weighing the military advantage to be gained against the risk of killing civilians, will present very genuine dilemmas in certain cases. The Mission does not consider this to be such a case. The firing of at least four mortar shells to attempt to kill a small number of specified individuals in a setting where large numbers of civilians were going about their daily business and 1,368 people were sheltering nearby cannot meet the test of what a reasonable commander would have determined to be an acceptable loss of civilian life for the military advantage sought. The Mission considers thus the attack to have been indiscriminate in violation of international law, and to have violated the right to life of the Palestinian civilians killed in these incidents.

Rapporto Goldstone: E. S. Ca.: 5. Obligation to take feasible precaution to protect civilian population and objects by Israel in Gaza - §§ 37-40.

2009-10-13T04:53:00.000-07:00

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C.
a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
5.
Obligation to take feasible precautions to protect civilian population and objects by Israel in Gaza

§§: 37 - 38 - 39 - 40 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno.

37. The Mission examined how Israeli forces discharged their obligation to take feasible precautions to protect the civilian population of Gaza, including particularly the obligation to give effective advance warning of attacks (Chapter IX). The Mission acknowledges the significant efforts made by Israel to issue warnings through telephone calls, leaflets and radio broadcasts and accepts that in some cases, particularly when the warnings were sufficiently specific, they encouraged residents to leave an area and get out of harms way. However, the Mission also notes factors that significantly undermined the effectiveness of the warnings issued. These include the lack of specificity and thus credibility of many pre-recorded phone messages and leaflets. The credibility of instructions to move to city centres for safety was also diminished by the fact that the city centres themselves had been the subject of intense attacks during the air phase of the military operations. The Mission also examined the practice of dropping lighter explosives on roofs (so-called “roof knocking”). It concludes that this technique is not effective as a warning and constitutes a form of attack against the civilians inhabiting the building. Finally, the Mission stresses that the fact that a warning was issued does not relieve a commander and his subordinates of taking all other feasible measures to distinguish between civilians and combatants.

38. The Mission also examined the precautions taken by Israeli forces in the context of three specific attacks they launched. On 15 January 2009, the UNRWA field office compound in Gaza City came under shelling with high explosive and white phosphorous munitions. The Mission notes that the attack was extremely dangerous, as the compound offered shelter to between 600 and 700 civilians and contained a huge fuel depot. The Israeli forces continued the attack over several hours in spite of having been fully alerted to the risks they created. The Mission concludes that Israeli armed forces violated the customary international law requirement to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and method of attack with a view to avoiding and in any event minimizing incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

39. The Mission also finds that, on the same day, the Israeli forces directly and intentionally attacked the Al Quds Hospital in Gaza City and the adjacent ambulance depot with white phosphorous shells. The attack caused fires which took a whole day to extinguish and caused panic among the sick and wounded who had to be evacuated. The Mission finds that no warning was given at any point of an imminent strike. On the basis of its investigation, the Mission rejects the allegation that fire was directed at Israeli forces from within the hospital.

40. The Mission also examined the intense artillery attacks, again including white phosphorous munitions, on Al Wafa hospital in eastern Gaza City, a facility for patients receiving long-term care and suffering from particularly serious injuries. On the basis of the information gathered, the Mission found a violation of the prohibition of attacks on civilian hospitals in the cases of both hospitals. The Mission also highlights that the warnings given by leaflets and pre-recorded phone messages in the case of Al Wafa hospital demonstrate the complete ineffectiveness of certain kinds of routine and generic warnings.

Rapporto Goldstone: E. S. Ca.: 4. Obligation to take feasible precautions to protect civilian population and objects by Palestinian… - §§ 35-36.

2009-10-13T01:02:00.000-07:00

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C.
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4.
Obligation to take feasible precautions to protect civilian population and objects by Palestinian armed groups in Gaza

§§: 35 - 36 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno.

35. The Mission examined whether and to what extent the Palestinian armed groups violated their obligation to exercise care and take feasible precautions to protect the civilian population in Gaza from the inherent dangers of the military operations (Chapter VIII). The Mission was faced with a certain reluctance by the persons it interviewed in Gaza to discuss the activities of the armed groups. On the basis of the information gathered, the Mission found that Palestinian armed groups were present in urban areas during the military operations and launched rockets from urban areas. It may be that the Palestinian combatants did not at all times adequately distinguish themselves from the civilian population. The Mission found no evidence, however, to suggest that Palestinian armed groups either directed civilians to areas where attacks were being launched or that they forced civilians to remain within the vicinity of the attacks.

36. Although the situations investigated by the Mission did not establish the use of mosques for military purposes or to shield military activities, it cannot exclude that this might have occurred in other cases. The Mission did not find any evidence to support the allegations that hospital facilities were used by the Gaza authorities or by Palestinian armed groups to shield military activities and that ambulances were used to transport combatants or for other military purposes. On the basis of its own investigations and the statements by UN officials, the Mission excludes that Palestinian armed groups engaged in combat activities from UN facilities that were used as shelters during the military operations. The Mission cannot, however, discount the possibility that Palestinian armed groups were active in the vicinity of such UN facilities and hospitals. While the conduct of hostilities in built-up areas does not, of itself, constitute a violation of international law, Palestinian armed groups, where they launched attacks close to civilian or protected buildings, unnecessarily exposed the civilian population of Gaza to danger.

Rapporto Goldstone: E. S. Ca.: 3. Attacks by Israeli forces on government buildings and persons of the Gaga authorities, including police §§ 32-34.

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C.
a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
3.
Attacks by Israeli forces on government buildings and persons of the Gaza autorities, including police

§§: 32 - 33 - 34 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno.

32. Israeli armed forces launched numerous attacks against buildings and persons of the Gaza authorities. As far as attacks on buildings are concerned, the Mission examined the Israeli strikes against the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Gaza main prison (Chapter VII). Both buildings were destroyed to an extent that puts them out of use. Statements by Israeli Government and armed forces representatives justified the attacks arguing that political and administrative institutions in Gaza are part of the “Hamas terrorist infrastructure”. The Mission rejects this position. It finds that there is no evidence that the Legislative Council building and the Gaza main prison made an effective contribution to military action. On the information available to it, the Mission finds that the attacks on these buildings constituted deliberate attacks on civilian objects in violation of the rule of customary international humanitarian law whereby attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives. These facts further indicate the commission of the grave breach of extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

33. The Mission examined the attacks against six police facilities, four of them during the first minutes of the military operations on 27 December 2008, resulting in the death of 99 policemen and nine members of the public. The overall around 240 policemen killed by Israeli forces constitute more than one sixth of the Palestinian casualties. The circumstances of the attacks and the Government of Israel July 2009 report on the military operations clarify that the policemen were deliberately targeted and killed on the ground that the police as an institution, or a large part of the policemen individually, are in the Government of Israel’s view part of the Palestinian military forces in Gaza.

34. To examine whether the attacks against the police were compatible with the principle of distinction between civilian and military objects and persons, the Mission analysed the institutional development of the Gaza police since Hamas took complete control of Gaza in July 2007 and merged the Gaza police with the “Executive Force” it had created after its election victory. The Mission finds that, while a great number of the Gaza policemen were recruited among Hamas supporters or members of Palestinian armed groups, the Gaza police were a civilian law-enforcement agency. The Mission also concludes that the policemen killed on 27 December 2008 cannot be said to have been taking a direct part in hostilities and thus did not lose their civilian immunity from direct attack as civilians on this ground. The Mission accepts that there may be individual members of the Gaza police that were at the same time members of Palestinian armed groups and thus combatants. It concludes, however, that the attacks against the police facilities on the first day of the armed operations failed to strike an acceptable balance between the direct military advantage anticipated (i.e. the killing of those policemen who may have been members of Palestinian armed groups) and the loss of civilian life (i.e. the other policemen killed and members of the public who would inevitably have been present or in the vicinity), and therefore violated international humanitarian law.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary. Ca.: 2. Overview of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip and casualties. §§ 29-31.

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C.
a. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings
2.
Overview of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip and casualties

§§: 29 - 30 - 31 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno.

29. Israel deployed its navy, air force and army in the operation it codenamed “Operation Cast Lead”. The military operations in the Gaza Strip included two main phases, the air phase and the air-land phase, and lasted from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009. The Israeli offensive began with a week-long air attack, from 27 December until 3 January 2009. The air force continued to play an important role in assisting and covering the ground forces from 3 January to18 January 2009. The army was responsible for the ground invasion, which began on 3 January 2009 when ground troops entered Gaza from the north and from the east. The available information indicates that the Golani, Givati and Paratrooper Brigades and five Armoured Corps Brigades were involved. The navy was used in part to shell the Gaza coast during the operations. Chapter VI also locates the incidents investigated by the Mission, described in Chapters VII to XV, in the context of the military operations.

30. Statistics about Palestinians who lost their life during the military operations vary. Based on extensive field research, non-governmental organizations place the overall number of persons killed between 1,387 and 1,417. The Gaza authorities report 1,444 fatal casualties. The Government of Israel provides a figure of 1,166. The data provided by non-governmental sources with regard to the percentage of civilians among those killed are generally consistent and raise very serious concerns with regard to the way Israel conducted the military operations in Gaza.

31. According to the Government of Israel, during the military operations there were 4 Israeli fatal casualties in southern Israel, of whom 3 were civilians and one soldier, killed by rockets and mortars attacks by Palestinian armed groups. In addition, 9 Israeli soldiers were killed during the fighting inside the Gaza strip, 4 of whom as a result of friendly fire.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary. Ca. Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings: 1. The Blockade. §§ 27-28.

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1.
The Blockade

§§: 27 - 28 -

27. The Mission focussed (Chapter V) on the process of economic and political isolation imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip, generally referred to as a “blockade”. The blockade comprises measures such as restrictions on the goods that can be imported into Gaza and the closure of border crossings for people, goods and services, sometimes for days, including cuts on the provision of fuel and electricity. Gaza’s economy is further severely affected by the reduction of the fishing zone open to the Palestinian fishermen and the establishment of a “buffer zone” along the border between Gaza and Israel which reduces the land available for agriculture and industrial activity. In addition to creating an emergency situation, the blockade significantly weakened the capacities of the population and of the health, water and other public sectors to react to the emergency created by the military operations.

28. The Mission holds the view that Israel continues to be duty-bound under the Fourth Geneva Convention and to the full extent of the means available to it to ensure the supply of foodstuff, medical and hospital items and others to meet the humanitarian needs of the population of the Gaza Strip without qualification.

Rapporto Goldstone: Executive Summary. B. Methodology. §§ 11-26.

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B.
Methodology

§§: 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20 - 21- 22 - 23 - 24 - 25 - 26 - Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno.

11. To implement its mandate, the Mission determined that it was required to consider any actions by all parties that might have constituted violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law. The mandate also required it to review related actions in the entire Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel.

12. With regard to temporal scope, the Mission decided to focus primarily on events, actions or circumstances occurring since 19 June 2008, when a ceasefire was agreed between the Government of Israel and Hamas. The Mission has also taken into consideration matters occurring after the end of military operations that constitute continuing human rights and international humanitarian law violations related to or as a consequence of the military operations, up to 31 July 2009.

13. The Mission also analysed the historical context of the events that led to the military operations in Gaza between during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 and the links between these operations and overarching Israeli policies vis-à-vis the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

14. The Mission considered that the reference in its mandate to violations committed “in the context” of the December–January military operations required it to include restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms relating to Israel's strategies and actions in the context of its military operations.

15. The normative framework for the Mission has been general international law, the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law.

16. This report does not purport to be exhaustive in documenting the very high number of relevant incidents that occurred in the period covered by the Mission’s mandate. Nevertheless, the Mission considers that the report is illustrative of the main patterns of violations. In Gaza, the Mission investigated 36 incidents.

17. The Mission based its work on an independent and impartial analysis of compliance by the parties with their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law in the context of the recent conflict in Gaza, and on international investigative standards developed by the United Nations.

18. The Mission adopted an inclusive approach in gathering information and seeking views. Information-gathering methods included: (a) the review of reports from different sources; (b) interviews with victims, witnesses and other persons having relevant information); (c) site visits to specific locations in Gaza where incidents had occurred; (d) the analysis of video and photographic images, including satellite imagery; (e) the review of medical reports about injuries to victims; (f) the forensic analysis of weapons and ammunition remnants collected at incident sites; (g) meetings with a variety of interlocutors; (h) invitations to provide information relating to the Mission’s investigation requirements; (i) the wide circulation of a public call for written submissions; (j) public hearings in Gaza and in Geneva.

19. The Mission conducted 188 individual interviews. It reviewed more than 300 reports, submissions and other documentation either researched of its own motion, received in reply to its call for submissions and notes verbales or provided during meetings or otherwise, amounting to more than 10,000 pages, over 30 videos and 1,200 photographs.

20. By refusing to cooperate with the Mission, the Government of Israel prevented it from meeting Israeli government officials, but also from travelling to Israel to meet with Israeli victims and to the West Bank to meet with Palestinian Authority representatives and Palestinian victims.

21. The Mission conducted field visits, including investigations of incident sites, in the Gaza Strip. This allowed the Mission to observe first-hand the situation on the ground, and speak to many witnesses and other relevant persons.

22. The purpose of the public hearings, which were broadcast live, was to enable victims, witnesses and experts from all sides to the conflict to speak directly to as many people as possible in the region as well as in the international community. The Mission gave priority to the participation of victims and people from the affected communities. The 38 public testimonies covered facts as well as legal and military matters. The Mission had initially intended to hold hearings in Gaza, Israel and the West Bank. However, denial of access to Israel and the West Bank resulted in the decision to hold hearings of participants from Israel and the West Bank in Geneva.

23. In establishing its findings, the Mission sought to rely primarily and whenever possible on information it gathered first-hand. Information produced by others, including reports, affidavits and media reports, was used primarily as corroboration.

24. The Mission’s final conclusions on the reliability of the information received were made taking into consideration the Mission’s assessment of the credibility and reliability of the witnesses it met, verifying sources and methodology used in reports and documents produced by
others, cross-referencing the relevant material and information, and assessing whether, in all the circumstances, there was sufficient information of a credible and reliable nature for the Mission to make a finding in fact.

25. On this basis, the Mission has, to the best of its ability, determined what facts have been established. In many cases it has found that acts entailing individual criminal responsibility have been committed. In all of these cases the Mission has found that there is sufficient information to establish the objective elements of the crimes in question. In almost all of the cases the Mission has also been able to determine whether or not it appears that the acts in question were done deliberately or recklessly or in the knowledge that the consequence that resulted would result in the ordinary course of events. The Mission has thus referred in many cases to the relevant fault element (mens rea). The Mission fully appreciates the importance of the presumption of innocence: the findings in the report do not subvert the operation of that principle. The findings do not attempt to identify the individuals responsible for the commission of offences nor do they pretend to reach the standard of proof applicable in criminal trials.

26. In order to provide the parties concerned with an opportunity to submit additional relevant information and express their position and respond to allegations, the Mission also submitted comprehensive lists of questions to the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza authorities in advance of completing its analysis and findings. The Mission received replies from the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza authorities but not from Israel.

Rapporto Goldstone: Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione. § 1: Istituzione della Missione d’inchiesta e ambito del suo mandato

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Sommario Esecutivo

A.
Introduzione

Home ← § 1 → 2 Index

Istituzione della Missione di inchiesta e ambito del suo mandato

1. On 3 April 2009, the President of the Human Rights Council established the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict with the mandate “to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.”

Traduzione italiana:

l. Il 3 aprile 2009 il presidente del Consiglio per i diritti umani ha istituito la Missione di inchiesta delle Nazioni Unite sul conflitto di Gaza, con il mandato di «indagare su tutte le violazioni del diritto internazionale sui diritti umani e del diritto internazionale umanitario che possano essere state commesse in qualunque momento nel contesto delle operazioni militari condotte a Gaza tra il 27 dicembre 2008 e il 18 gennaio 2009, siano esse avvenute prima, durante o dopo».

Links, note e commenti:

1) Il Consiglio dei diritti umani è una delle numerose articolazioni che compongono l’ONU, un organismo che nasce come un prodotto della seconda mondiale, allo stesso modo in cui la Società delle Nazioni era un prodotto della prima guerra mondiale. Sia l’uno che l’altro sono stati in realtà uno strumento nelle mani delle potenze vincitrici, ma tuttavia con qualche margine di flessibilità che consente con il tempo a stati formalmente sovrani di assumere una qualche autonomia di fronte alle superpotenze, che non a caso hanno più volte minacciato di abolire l’ONU per sostituirlo con una più docile Lega delle democrazie. L’ONU vive sotto ricatto permanete degli USA che non pagano le quote necessarie alla sopravvivenza stessa dell’Organizzazione. Sarebbe interessante – se mai qualcuno vi si accingesse o se già non esiste – una storia organica di tutti i condizionamenti subiti dall’ONU nonché dei suoi momenti di autonomia. Va notato che il mutamento dell’ONU è in larga parte la conseguenza del processo di decolonizzazione e del sorgere di nuovi stati nominalmente sovrani che hanno per questo diritto ad un seggio alla Nazioni Unite, ossia all’interno della sua Assemblea generale. Che poi contino effettivamente qualcosa è tutta altra storia. Il Consiglio per i Diritti Umani della Nazioni Unite nasce dunque il 15 marzo 2006, a seguito di una risoluzione dell’Assemblea Generale, che riceve il voto favorevole di 170 su 191. È interessante annotare chi votò contro: gli Stati Uniti, le Isole Marshall, Palau e Israele. Di Palau si sa già che ha delegato agli USA tutta la sua politica estera e quindi il suo voto è un semplice doppione di quello degli USA. Si astennero Iran, Venezuela e Bielorussia. Per ogni singolo paese, comunque abbia votato, andrebbe redatta una scheda che spieghi come e perché abbia adottato quella decisione. Per altre notizie sul Consiglio esiste un’ampia documentazione e qui stesso vi ritorneremo nel corso del nostro commentario. Le notizie fornite da Wikipedia sono sospette di inquinamento sionista. Il Consiglio ha un suo Presidente con rotazione triennale. Il primo presidente eletto il 16 maggio 2006 è stato il rappresentante messicano Luis Alfonso de Alba.

2) Gaza conflicts continues. – Dal Guardian una galleria di 32 foto con didascalie del massacro di Gaza durante l’operazione Piombo Fuso. Le stesse foto, ma senza didascalie, verrano riportate più avanti come illustrazione semplice.

Documenti: 1. Il rapporto Goldstone: Homepage

2009-10-10T10:08:00.000-07:00

A/HRC/12/48
15 September 2009

Fonte

Chi vuole scaricare il documento originale in pdf clicchi su “Fonte”. o su “pdf”. Di questo testo base viene qui curata una nuova edizione con diverso editing ed integrazioni varie. Si vuol dare un valore aggiunto rispetto all’originale, dal quale ci si discosta in alcuni aspetti redazionali ovvero correggendo eventuali refusi. Il nostro editing sarà corredato da un’iconografia che ne allegerisca la lettura al monitor. Si avverte che le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e possono essere modificate o annullate in qualsiasi momento, ove ciò appaia opportuno o sia richiesto dagli aventi diritto sulle immagini. Esse hanno lo scopo di alleggerire la pesantezza grafica del solo testo. Viene redatto un Indice analitico per paragrafi (§§), disponibile qui alla fine di questo Indice Sommario. Nel pdf originale la numerazione in paragrafi giunge a 1805 fino a pagina 494, poi nella parte IV con evidente errore arretra a 1570 e così prosegue fino alle fine 1776. Per ripristinare la successione logica qui seguita occorre sommare il numero 236 ad ogni paragrafo dalla Parte IV in poi. Questa numerazione così ottenuta è quella da noi seguita per la redazione dell’Indice analitico e per ogni altra citazione.

Il Consiglio dei diritti umani in data 3 aprile 2009 istituì una commissione di inchiesta per indagare su tutte le violazioni del diritto internazionale commesse in Gaza durante l’operazione militare israeliana nota con il nome di “Piombo Fuso”, durante il periodo dal 27 dicembre 2008 e il 18 gennaio 2009, che “fece più di 1400 vittime nel campo palestinese e 13 in quello israeliano: una disparità che è più eloquente di qualsiasi rapporto”. Ciò non ostante il Capo Missione Richard Goldstone, autodefinitosi “ebreo” e “sionista” sembra aver avuto recentemente strani ripensamenti sul rapporto che porta il suo nome. In tutto il mondo è in corso un dibattito, ma nel frattempo si è resa disponibile la traduzione italiana del documento, che è stato approvato ufficialmente dall’ONU e di cui ora il governo israeliano tenta di ottenere il ritiro, come già gli riuscì per la dichiarazione di Durban I, che equiparava razzismo e sionismo. Viene qui pubblicato in questo blog il testo originale e la versione italiana. Le illustrazioni sono liberamente attinte dalla rete e sono redazionali gli apparati aggiunti. Per la traduzione del testo ci si basa sulla versione edita da Zambon Editore, distaccandosi da essa quando e se parrà opportuno, dandone adeguata spiegazione. Il volume è da recensito noi in Civium Libertas, dove viene monitorato anche la sua recezione e il dibattito. Esso esce in questo aprile 2011 e lo si si può acquistare per 19,80 € agli indirizzi indicati. Ci si augura che la conoscenza diretta e capillare del testo promuova una maggiore consapevolezza di quello che appare essere il conflitto più emblematico della nostra epoca.

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Twellfth session

HUMAN RIGHTS IN PALESTINE AND OTHER
OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict∗

*Late submission

SOMMARIO ESECUTIVO

A.
Introduzione.

§§: 1-10 = Sommario Esecutivo. A. Introduzione.
1: Istituzione della Missione d’inchiesta e ambito del suo mandato.
2: Nomina del Capo della Missione e degli altri Membri.
3: Segreteria.
4: La popolazione civile.
5: Riunioni e visite.
6: Invio di note verbali agli Stati.
7: Audizioni pubbliche in Gaza e a Ginevra.
8: Accesso alla Striscia attraverso il valico di Rafah.
9: Mancata collaborazione da parte del governo israeliano.
10: Incarcerazione di Muhammad Srou.

B.
Methodology.

§§ 11-26:
11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20 - 21- 22 - 23 - 24 - 25 - 26 -

C.
Facts investigated by the Mission, factual and legal findings

a) The Occupied Palestinian Territory: the Gaza Strip.

1. The Blockade: §§ 27 - 28 -
2. Overview of Israel’s operation in the Gaza Strip and casualities: §§ 29 - 30 - 31 -
3. Attacks by Israeli forces on government buildings and persons of the Gaza authorities, including police: §§ 32 - 33 - 34 -
4. Obligations to take feasible precautions to protect civilian population and objects by Palestinian armed groups in Gaza: §§ 35 - 36 -
5. Obligation to take feasible precautions to protect civilian populazione and objects by Israel in Gaza: §§ 37 - 38 - 39 - 40 -
6. Indiscriminate attacks by Israely forces resulting in the loss of life and injury to civilians: §§: 41 - 42 -
7. Deliberate attacks againts the civilian population: §§ 43 - 44 - 45 - 46 - 47 -
8. The use of certain weapons: §§ 48 - 49 -
9. Attacks on the foundations of civilian life in Gaza: destruction ofindustrial infrastructure, food production, water installations, sewage treatment and housing: §§ 50 - 51 - 52 - 53 - 54 .
10. The use of Palestian civilians as human shields: §§ 55 .
11. Deprivation of liberty: Gazans detained during the Israeli operation of 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009: §§ 56 - 57 - 58 - 59 - 60 -
12. Objectives and strategy of israel’s military operations in Gaza: §§ 61 - 62 - 63 - 64 .
13. The impact of the military operations and the blockade on the Gaza population and the human right: §§ 65 - 66 - 67 - 68 - 69 - 70 - 71 - 72 - 73 - 74 - 75 .
14. The continuing detention of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit: §§ 76 - 77 - 78 .
15. Internal violence and targeting of Fateh affiliates by securities services under the control of the Gaza authorities: §§ 79 - 80 .

b) The Occupied Palestinian Territory: the West Bank, including East jerusalem.

§: 81 - 82 -

16. Treatments of Palestinians by Israeli security forces in the West Baknk, including use of excessive or lethal force during demonstrations: §§ 83 - 84 - 85.
17. Detention of Palestinians in Israeli prisons: §§: 86 - 87 - 88 - 89 - 90 - 91 -
18. Restrictions on freedom of movement in the West Bank: §§ 92 - 93 - 94 - 95 - 96 -

19. Internal violence and targeting of Hamas supporters by the Palestinian Authority, restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly.

c) Israel.

20. Impact on civilians of rocket and mortar attacks by Palestinian armed groups on southern Israel.
21. Repressions of dissent in Israel, the right of access to information and treatment of human rights defenders.

D.
Accountability

22. Proceedings carried out or being carried out and responses by Israel to allegations of violations by security forces against Palestinians (Chapter XXV).
23. Proceedings carried out or being carried out by Palestinian authorities (Chapter XXVI).
(a) Procedings related to actions in the Gaza Strip.
(b) Procedings related to actions in the West Bank.
24. Universal jurisdiction.
25. Reparations.

E.
Conclusions and recommendations

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

a) Cooperation with the parties.
b) Protection of persons cooperating with the Mission.
c) Acknowledgments.

I.
METHODOLOGY
A.
Mandate and terms of reference.
B.
methods of work.

– A note on the public hearings.

C.
Assessment of information.
D.
Consultations with the parties.

II.
CONTEXT
Introduction
A.
Historical context.
B.
Overview of Israeli’s pattern of policies and conduct relevant to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and links between the situations in Gaza and in the West Bank.
C.
Relevant political and administrative structures in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
D.
Relevant political and administrative structures in Israel.

III.
EVENTS OCCURRING BETWEEN THE “CEASEFIRE” OF
18 JUNE 2008 BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE GAZA AUTHORITIES
AND THE START OF ISRAEL’S MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
GAZA ON 27 DECEMBER 2008

IV.
APPLICABLE LAW
A.
Self-determination.
B.
International humanitarian law.
C.
International criminal law.
D.
International human right law.

PART TWO
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY: THE GAZA STRIP

Section A

V.
THE BLOCKADE: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

VI.
OVERVIEW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY ISRAEL IN GAZA BETWEEN 27 DECEMBER 2008 AND

18 JANUARY 2009 AND DATA ON CASUALTIES

A.
The parties relevant to the conduct of military activities in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 Januar 2009
1.
The Israeli armed forces
2.
Palestinian armed groups
B.
The phases of the hostilities
1.
Air phase
2.
The air-land phase
C.
Data on casualties during the Israeli military operations in Gaza from 28 december 2008 to 17 January 2009
1.
Palestinian casualties
2.
Israeli casualties

VII.
ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS
AND POLICE
A.
Deliberate attacks on Gaza goverment infractrusture
1.
Overview of damage to Gaza goverment buildings
2.
The Israeli air strikes on the Gaza prison and on the Palestinian Legislative Council building
3.
The position of the Government of Israel
4.
Factual findings
5.
Legal analysis
B.
Deliberate attacks on the Gaza police
1.
Information regarding the attacks on the police headquarters and police stations visited by the Mission
2.
Conflicting charachterizations of the Gaza securities forces

a) The approach of the Government of Israel.
b) The approach of the Gaza authorities.

3.
The Mission’s assessment of the role and composition of the police
4.
Factual findings
5.
Legal analysis

a) The applicable rules of international humanitarian law.
b) Conclusion

VIII.
OBLIGATION ON PALESTINIAN ARMED GROUPS IN GAZA TO TAKE FEASIBLE
PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
A.
Launching attacks from within civilian areas and from within or in the immediate vicinity of protected sites.
B.
Booby-trapping of civilian houses.
C.
Use of mosques to launch attacks against the Israeli armed forces or to store weaposns.
D.
Misuse of medical facilities and ambulances.
1.
Use of hospitals for military purposes.
2.
Ambulances.
E.
Forcing civilians to remain in an area for the specific purpose of sheltering that area or forces in that area from attack.
F.
Mingling with the civilian population to shield combatants against attack.
G.
Factuals findings.
H.
Legals findings.

IX.
OBLIGATION ON ISRAEL TO TAKE FEASIBLE PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT
CIVILIAN POPULATION AND CIVILIAN OBECTS IN GAZA
A.
warnigs.
1.
Telephone calls.
2.
Roof-knocking.
3.
Radio broadcasts and leaflet dropping.
4.
Factual findings.

(a) The questions of whether civilians could be expected to respond to the warnings to leave their homes.
(b) Events in the city centre after the warning to go there was issued.
(c) The inference that those who did not go to the city centres nust be combatants.

5.
Israel’s review.
6.
Legal findings.

(a) Pre-recorded generic telephone calls.
(b) Warning shots delivered to roofs.
(c) Leaftlets.

7.
Conclusions.
B.
UNRWA compound, Gaza City.
1.
The immediate context.
2.
The risk.
3.
The strikes.
4.
Communications and responses.
5.
Weaposn use.
6.
The Israeli response.
7.
Factual and legal findings.
C.
Al-Quds hospital, Tal el-Hara, Gaza City.
1.
The facts
2.
The Israeli position
3.
Factual findings
4.
Legal findings
D.
Attacks on al-Wafa hospital, 5 and 16 January 2009
1.
The facts
2.
Factual findings
3.
Legal findings

X.
INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS BY ISRAELI ARMED FORCES
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF LIFE AND INJURY TO CIVILIANS
A.
The shelling in al-Fakhura Street by Israeli armed forces
B.
The facts surrounding the Israeli armed forces’ morta shelling.
C.
The Israeli position.
D.
Other reports.
E.
Factual findings.
F.
Legal findings
1.
The issue of military advantange.

XI.
DELIBERATE ATTACKS AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
Introduction.
A.
Attacks on the houses of Atey al-Samouni in Zeytoun, resulting in the death of 23 members of the al-Samouni family.
1.
The killing of Ateya al.samouni and his son Ahmad.
2.
The attack on the house of Wa’el al- Samouni.
3.
The attempts of PRCS and ICRC to rescue the civilians in the al-Samouni area.
4.
Factual findings.
B.
Killing of civilian attempting to leave their homes to walk to safer areas
1.
The shooting of Ivad al-Samouni.
2.
Factual findings.
3.
The death of Muhammad Hajji in the attack on his family’s house and shooting of Shahd Hajji and Ola Masood Arafat
4.
Factual findings.
5.
The shooting of Ibrahim Juha.
6.
Factual findings.
7.
The killing of Majda and Rayya Hajaj.
8.
Factual findings.
9.
The shooting of Amal, Souad, Samar and Hajja Souad Abd Rabbo
10.
Factual findings.
11.
The shooting of Rouhiyah al-Najjar.
12.
Factual findings.
13.
The Abu Halima family case.
14.
Factual findings
C.
Information concerning the instructions given to the Israeli armed forces with regard to the opening of fire against civilians.
D.
Legal findings with regard to the cases investigated by the Mission.
E.
The attack on the al-Maqadmah mosque, 3 January 2009.
1.
Events.
2.
The position of the Israeli Government and the Israeli armed forces.
3.
Factual findings.
4.
Legal findings.
F.
The attack on the al.Daya family house, 6 January 2009.
1.
Events.
2.
The Israeli position.
3.
Factual findings.
4.
Legal findings.
G.
Attack on the Abd al-Dayem condolence tents.
1.
Events
2.
The Israeli position.
3.
Factual findings.
4.
Legal findings.

XII.
THE USE OF CERTAIN WEAPONS

A.
Whithe phosphorous
B.
Flechettes
C.
Alleged use of munitions causing a specific type of iniury
D.
Factual findings on the use of munitions causing a specific type of iniury
E.
Allegations regarding the use of depleted and non-depleted uranium munitions by the Israeli armed forces

XIII.
ATTACKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVILIAN LIFE IN GAZA:
DESTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE, FOOD PRODUCTION,
WATER INSTALLATIONS, SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS AND HOUSING
A.
The destruction of el-Bader flour mill

a) Factual findings
b) Legal findings

B.
The destruction of the Sawafeary chicken farm

a) Factual findings
b) Legal findings

C.
The destruction of water and sewage installation

1. The Gaza wasterwater treatment plant, Road No. 10, al-Sheikh Ejlin, Gaza City
a) Factual findings

2. Namar wells group, Salah ad-Din Street, Jabaliyah refuge camp
a) Factual findings
b) Legal findings

D.
The destruction of housing

a) Factual findings
b) Corroboration of Mission’s findings and widespread nature of hausing destruction
c) Legal findings

E.
Analysis of the pattern of widespread destruction of economic and infracstrural targets
1.
Construction industry
2.
Destruction of the remaining food industry
3.
Destruction of water installations

a) Conclusions
b) General legal findings

XIV.
THE USE OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS AS HUMAN SHIELDS
A.
The case of Majdi Abd Rabbo
B.
The case of Ahmad Ibrahim Halawa
C.
The case of Mahamoud Abd Rabbo al-Ajrami
D.
The case of AD/03
E.
Denial of allegations by the Israeli armed forces
F.
Factual findings
G.
Legal findings

XV.
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY: GAZANS DETAINED DURING THE ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS
OF 27 DECEMBER 2008 TO 18 JANUARY 2009
A.
Al-Atatra sandipts
B.
Detention and abuse of AD/02
C.
AD/03
D.
Factual findinds
E.
Legal findings

XVI.
OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY OF ISRAEL’S MILITARY OPERATIONS IN GAZA
A.
Planning
1.
The context
2.
Legal input and training of soldiers on legal standars
3.
The means at the disposal of the Israeli armed forces
B.
The developments of strategic objectives in Israeli military thinking
C.
Official Israeli statements on the objectives of the military operations in Gaza
D.
The strategy to achieve the obiectives

XVII.
THE IMPACT OF THE BLOCKADE AND OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS ON
THE PEOPLE OF GAZA AND THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS
A.
The economy, livelihoods and employment
B.
Food and nutrition
C.
Housing
D.
Water and sanitations
E.
Enviroment
F.
Physical and mental health
G.
Education
H.
Impact on woman and children
I.
Persons with disabilities
J.
Impact on humanitarians assistance provided by the United Nations
K.
Legal analysis

XVIII.
THE CONTINUING DETENTION OF ISRAELI SOLDIER GILAD SHALIT

a) Legal findings and conlusions

Section B

XIX.
INTERNAL VIOLENCE AND TARGETING OF FATAH AFFILIATES BY
SECURITY SERVICES UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE GAZA AUTHORITIES
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY: THE WEST BANK, INCLUDING EAST
JERUSALEM

a) Factual findings
b) Legal findings

WEST BANK

Introduction
Methodology

XX.
TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK BY ISRAELI SECURITY
FORCES, INCLUDING USE OF EXCESSIVE OR LETHAL FORCE DURING
DEMONSTRATIONS

a) The use of force against Gaza solidarity demontrations in the West Bank during the Israeli operation in Gaza
b) The increased level of force since the end of the operation in Gaza
c) The role of impunity
d) Legal analysis and conlusions
1. Violence by settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank
Conclusions
2. Action by Israel with regard to solidarity demonstrations
Conclusions
e) Violence by Israeli security forces outside the context of demonstrations
Accountability
Conclusions

XXI.
DETENTION OF PALESTINIANS IN ISRAELI PRISONS
A.
Detainees-Issues linked to Israel’s December-January military operations in Gaza
1.
Differential treatment of Gaza prisoners
2.
Increase in Children from the West Bank arrested and detained during/post OCL

a) “Ahmad Q: 15-years old boy arrested on 1 January 2009 and accused of throwing stones.

3.
Members of the Palestinian Legislative Summary

a) Arrest, Interrogation, and Detention conditions
b) Associated measures
c) Recent developments

d) The Downgrading of Hamas prisoners

e) Effect of the detention of the PLC members: disabling the Legislative and enabling the Executive

B.
Legal Analysis and Conclusions

a) The military courts system and Israel’s detention of Palestinians from the oPt in general
b) The use of detention in the context of the Mission’s Mandate
c) Detention of children
d) Additional legal issue

XXII.
ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO FREE MOVEMENT AND ACCESS
Introduction
Movement and access and the Israely military operations in Gaza
West Bank closures during the Israeli operations in Gaza
New measures to formalize the separation of Gaza and the West Bank
Jerusalem: accelerating the “silent transfer”
New settlement, land expropriation and the demolition of villages in the Area C
Connecting the dots
Legal analysis and conclusions

XXIII.

INTERNAL VIOLENCE, TARGETING OF HAMAS SUPPORTERS AND

RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND EXPRESSION BY THE

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
A.
Crackdown by the Palestinian Authority on Hamas and other Islamic parties
1.
Arrest and detention by the security forces
2.
Torture and the other ill-treatment
3.
Freedom of association
4.
Appointments
B.
Freedom of the press, freedom of expression and opinion
C.
Freedom of assembly: repression of demonstration during the Israeli Military operation in Gaza of 27 December 2008 - 18 January 2009
D.
Legal analysis
E.
Conclusions

PART THREE: ISRAEL

Introduction
Methodology

XXIV.
THE IMPACT ON CIVILIANS OF ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS BY
PALESTINIAN ARMED GROUPS ON SOUTHERN ISRAEL
1.
Summary of rocket and mortar fire
from 18 June 2008 to 31 July 2009
A.
18 June - 26 December 2008
B.
27 December 2008 - 18 January 2009
C.
19 January 2009 - 31 July 2009
2.
Relevant Palestinian armed groups
3.
Type of rockets and mortars held by Palestinian armed groups

(a) al-Qassams
(b) 122 mm Grad rocket
(c) 220 mm Fadjr-3 rocket
(d) Anti-armour rockets
(e) Mortars

4.
Rocket and mortar attacks by the Palestinian armed groups on Israel
5.
Statements by Palestinian armed groups concerning their launching of rockets into Israel
6.
Statements by the Gaza authorities to the Mission
7.
Precautionary measures in effect in Southern Israel

(a) The Tseva Adom early warning system
(b) Construction of fortifications and sheletrs

8.
Impact of rocket and mortar fire on communities in southern Israel
9.
Fatalities
10.
Physical injuries
11.
Psychological trauma/mental health
12.
Damage to Property
13.
Impact on the right to education
14.
Impact on the economic and social life of communities
15.
The unrecognized Palestinian Arab Bedouin villages of the Negev
16.
Recognized Palestinian towns and villages in southern Israel
17.
Legal analysis and conclusions
18.
Findings

XXV.
REPRESSION OF DISSENT IN ISRAEL, RIGHT TO ACCESS TO INFORMATION
AND TREATMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
A.
Protests inside Israel
1.
General
2.
Police Conduct
3.
Arrest of protesters
4.
Physical violence against protesters

a) Ben Gurion street, Haifa, 1 January 2009
b) Egyptian embassy, Tel Aviv, 29 December 2008
c) Kofor Cana and Umm al-Fahem (date unknown)

5.
Other inappropriate conduct

B.
Judicial responses following the arrests of protesters
1.
Detention pending trial
2.
Bail conditions

C.
The interrogation of political activists by the General Security Services
D.
Freedom of association and treatment of human right organizations inside Israel
1.
New Profile
2.
Breaking the Silence
E.
The access of media and human rights monitors to Gaza prior to, during and after the military operations

1. Media
2. International human rights monitors

F.
Legal analysis and conclusions

a) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
b) Declaration on the Right and Responsability of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally recognized Human Right and Fundamental Freedoms.

1.
Protests
2.
Judicial Responses
3.
Interrogations by the General Security Services
4.
Freedom of association and treatment of human rights organisations
5.
Access to information: access of media and human rights monitors to Gaza
5.

PART FOUR:
ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES

XXVI.
PROCEEDINGS AND RESPONSES BY ISRAEL TO ALLEGATIONS OF
VIOLATIONS BY ITS ARMED FORCES AGAINST PALESTINIANS
A.
Action taken by Israel investigate and prosecute suspected violations
1.
Israeli’s system of investigation and prosecution

(a) Disciplinary proceedings
(b) Operational debriefings
(c) Special investigations
(d) Criminal investigations

2.
Legal assessment

XXVII.
PROCEEDINGS BY PALESTINIAN AUTHORITIES

A.
Proceedings related to actions in the Gaza Strip
B.
Proceedings related to the actions in the West Bank

XXVIII.
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

XXIX.
REPARATION
A.
The right to a remedy and reparation under international
B.
Compensation and reparations to the Palestinian people in the Gaza strip

PART FIVE:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

XXX.
CONCLUSIONS
A.
Concluding observations
B.
The Israeli military operations in Gaza:
relevance to/links with Israeli’s policies vis-à-vis the OPT
C.
Nature, objectives and targets of the Israeli military operations in Gaza
D.
Occupation, resilience and civil society
E.
Rocket and mortar attacks in Israel
F.
Dissenting voices in Israel
G.
The impact of dehumanization
H.
The intra-Palestinian situation
I.
The need for protection and the role of the international community
J.
Summary of legal findings
1.
Action by Israel in Gaza in the context of the military operations of 27 december 2008 to 18 January 2009

(a) Precautions in launcing attacks
(b) Incidents involving the killing of civilians
(c) Certain weapons used by the Israeli forces
(d) Treatment of Palestinian in the hands of Israeli forces
(e) Use of human shields
(f) Detention
(g) Destruction of property
(h) Impact of the blockade and the military operations on the Gaza population
(i) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and acts raising individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law.

2.
Action by Israel in the West Bank in the context of the military operations in Gaza from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009

(a) Treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank by Israeli security forces, including use of excessive or lethal force during demonstrations
(b) Detention of Palestinian by Israel
(c) Violation of the right to free movement and access.

3.
Action by Israel in Israel
4.
Action by Palestinian armed group
5.
Action by responsible Palestinian authorities

L.
The need for accountability

XXXI.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Annex I
Annex II
Annex III

INDICI

1.
INDICE ANALITICO

“pdf” originale,

dove da pagina 494 in poi l’erronea numerazione dei paragrafi, da 1570 in poi, deve essere aumentata del numero 236 per ottenere una numerazione reale e univoca, in base alla quale è redatto questo Indice.

Blockade: 27 - 65 - 66 - 70 - 78 - 130 - 204 - 225 - 262 - 278 - 280 - 311 - 312 - 313 - 314 - 317 - 319 - 320 - 321 - 323 - 324 - 910 - 911 - 932 - 1214 - 1215 - 1216 - 1217 - 1222 - 1227 - 1228 - 1231 - 1241 - 1242 - 1248 - 1249 - 1255 - 1264 - 1265 - 1271 - 1272 - 1288 - 1289 - 1308 - 1315 - 1324 - 1338 - 1892 - 1893 - 1911 - 1912 - 1914 - 1915 - 1941 - 1949 - 1964 - 2000.

Chicken: 51 - 54 - 342 - 345 - 705 - 753 - 779 - 939 - 940 - 946 - 947 - 948 - 951 - 952 - 956 - 957 - 1014 - 1016 - 1203 - 1234 -
Dahiya doctrine: 62 - 1191 - 1193 - 1209 - 1300.
Flechettes: §§ 48 - 703 - 869 - 876 - nt 484 - 898 - 899 - 900 - 901 - 1957 - 2005 .
Gilad Shalit: 76 - 77 - 78 - 90 - 189 - 210 - 1063 - 1068 - 1076 - 1116 - 1330 - 1331 - 1332 - 1334 - 1335 - 1336 - 1337 - 1338 - 1503 - 1510 - 1511 - 1515 - 1516 - 1517 -1768 - 1985 - 2006.
Human schields: 36 - 55 - 294 - 347 - 441 - 442 - 450 - 474 - 475 - 476 - 478 - 480 - 481 - 485 - 490 - 491 - 495 - 619 - 668 - 987 - 1028 - 1059 - 1084 - 1085 - 1086 - 1093 - 1094 - 1095 - 1096 - 1097 - 1101 - 1103 - 1106 - 1143 - 1162 - 1689 - 1732 - 1750 - 1761.
Mental Health: 69 - 137 - 1255 - 1257 - 1259 - 1261 - 1263 - 1278 - 1280 - 1298 - 1674 - 1686 - 1943 - 2008.
White phosphourus: §§ 38 - 39 - 40 - 48 - 68 - 465 - 518 - 541 - 542 - 543 - 550 - 553 - 554 - 555 - 556 - 557 - 558 - 559 - 568 - 572 - 573 - 575 - 579 - 580 - 591 - 594 - 595 - 596 - 602 - 613 - 627 - 633 - 634 - 646 - 647 - 703 - 779 - 784 nt - 789 - 795 - 797 - 882 - 883 - 884 - 885 - 886 - 887 - 889 - 890 - 891 - 893 - 894 - 895 - 897 - 1226 - 1952 - 1957 - 2004 - 2008.

§ 3°GB: Subject Pronouns: he, she, it - Present Tense “to be": 3ª p.s - Present Progressive: 3ª p.s. - Yes/No Questions.

2008-03-25T11:52:00.001-07:00

Index - Lesson 2nd ↔ 4th || 00 w

A desk

Sommario: 1. Subject Pronouns: he, she, it. – 2. Present Tense “to be”. – 3. Present Progressive: 3ª p.s. – 4. Yes/No Questions. –

He’s Tom Jones.
He’s in the classroom.
He’s opening the book.
The book is open now.
The is on the desk.

Who’s he?
He’s Tom Jones.
Where is he?
He’s in the classroom.
What’s he doing?
He’s opening the book.
Is the book open or closed now?
It’s open now.

Where is the book?
It’s on the desk.

Who’s she?
She’s Mary Grant.
She’s short.
She’s old.
She’s fat.
She’s sad.

Who’s she?
She’s Ann Scott.
She’s tall.
She’s young.
She’s thin.
She’happy.
She’s writing in the notebook.
She’s writing on the blackboard.
She’s picking up the pen.
She’s picking up the pencil.

§ 2°GB: Yes/No Questions - Subject Pronouns: he, it - Present Progressive: 3ª p.s.

2007-12-31T13:36:00.000-08:00

Index - Lesson 1rst ↔ § 3th || + 43 w

A newspaper

Sommario: 1. Yes/No Questions. – 2. Subiect Pronouns. – 3. Present Progressive (3ª p.s.).

April, answer, armchair, August, birth, boy, brother, cat, classroom, child, conversation, date, daughter, December, dog, door, father, February, floor, girl, husband, information, January, July, June, letter, May, man, March, mother, November, October, parent, pipe, question, September, seat, son, train, wife, window, woman, year

Yes/No Questions

• He is writing a letter.
• Is he writina a letter?
• It is closed.
• Is it closed?
• He is the new teacher.
• Is he the new teacher?
• It is on the desk.
• Is it on the desk?
• The door is open.
• Is the door open?

Subject Pronouns

he = Tom Baker, Bill Smith, John Green, Dick Johnson
it = chair, table, book, notebook

• Richard Brown is a teacher.
• He’s closing the window.
• Where’s Tom Baker?
• It’s on the floor.

Present Progressive

(3ª persona singolare)

Long Form = He is reading
Short Form = He’s reading

• What’s he doing now?
• • He’s opening the door.
• • He’s reading a letter.
• • He’s walking.

§ 1°GB: Subject Pronouns: he, it - Present Tense “to be”: 3ª p.s. - Questions Words: what, where, who - Present Progressive: 3ª p.s. – How to ask for…

2007-01-30T04:08:00.000-08:00

Index - Lesson → 2nd || + 23 words

a book

Sommario: 1. Subject pronouns: he, it. – 2. Present Tense “to be”: 3ª p. s. – 3. Question words: what, where, who. – 4. Present Progressive: 3ª p.s. – 5. How to ask for someone’s name. – 6. How to ask someone to spell a word. – 7. How to ask where someone lives. – z. Lessico e fraseologia.

Address, book, chair, desk, family, gramophone, hand, magazine, morning, name, newspaper, notebook, number, pen, pencil, phone, road, record, street, surname, student, table, teacher.

Subject Pronouns: he, it

he = Tom, Bill, John, Dick; it = chair, table, book, notebook

• That’s John Parker. He’s the new teacher.
• Where’s the book. It’s on the table.

He’s Tom Jones.
He’s Bill Bush.
He’s John Kennedy.
He’s Dick Johnson.

A table

It’s a table.
It’s a notebok.
It’s a pen.
It’s a pencil.
It’s a desk.
It’s a chair.
It’a book.
It’s a magazine.

Present Tense “to be”

(3ª persona singolare)

Long Form = he, it is. Short Form = he’s, it’s.

• He is John Parker. → He’s John Parker.
• It is a newspaper. → It’s a newspaper-

He is the new teacher

He is the new teacher → He’s the new teacher.
This is a table.
This is a gramophone.
This is a record.
It’a a record.
The record is on the gramophone.
The gramophone is on the table.
It’a a book.
It’s a notebook.
It’a a pen.
It’s a pencil.
It’a a desk.
He’s Bill Smith.
It’s a magazine.
It’s a chair.

Question Words:

what where who

• What’s is this? It’s a book.
• What’s he doing? He’s reading.
• Where’s the pen? It’s on the table.
• Who’s he? He’s John Williamson.

A notebook

What’s this? It’s a notebook.
What’s this? It’s a pen.
Where is it? It’s on the chair.
What’s this? It’s a pencil.
What’s this? It’s a book.
Where is it? It’s on the table.
What’s this? It’s a desk.
What’s this? It’s a magazine.
What’s this? It’a a chair.
Where’s the book? It’s on the table.
Where’s the pen? It’s on the desk.
Who’s he? He’s John Mansfeld,
What’s he?He is the new teacher.
Who’s he? He’s Tom Baker.
What is she doing?

Present Progressive

(3ª persona singolare)

Long Form = he is reading. Short Form = he’s reading.

• He’s reading a magazine now.
• He’s talking now.

A magazine

He’s reading a magazine.
He’s writing a letter.
He’s talking to the teacher.
He’s walking to school.
What’s doing? He’s playing footbal.
He’opening the door.
He’s picking up the book.
He’s closing di notebook.
He’s playing football.
He’s carrying an umbrella.
He’s sitting at his desk.
He’s standing up.
He’s teaching an English class.
He’s studying English.
He’s watching the class.
He’s turning off the radio.

How to ask for someone’s name

• What’ your first family name?
• What is your surname?
• I don’t think I know your name?
• • My name is Tom Grant.

a. Find out what your first and last names are ranked in popularity and statistics of how many other people in the US share your name! → Link.

b. The Internet Surname Database. → Link.
c. I don’t know your name. Lirics → Link.
d. My name is John. → Link.
e. How ask for a raise. → Link.
g. How to ask for a Reference Letter. → Link.
h. How to ask for a Letter of Recommendation. → Link.

How to ask someone to spell a word

• How do you spell that?

a. How to Spell Last Name? → Link.
b. How do you ask someone to spell their name in french? → Link.

How to ask where someone lives

• Where are you staying? – I’am staying in…

• What’s your address? – 21, Station Road.

• Are you living in…? – Yes/No, I’m living in…

a. How to Say “Where is the Bathroom” in Several Different Languages. → Link.

Lessico e fraseologia

The address on the envelope

1. Address: the place where a person or organization can be found or communicated with. – a. What’s your address? 29, Station Road. – b. Say and spell your name and give your address and phone number. – c. Will you put your name and permanent address on the back? – d. A friend gave me the address of his tailor. – e. You can get the address from their letter. – f. They have a new address. – g. Did they have a new address? – h. I’ve changed my address. – i. He said he didn’t know John’s address. – j. Give you me your address? – k. Would you give me your address? – l. Can you full me the full address? – m. The address on the envelope. –

Books

2. Book: a written work or composition that has been published. – a. It’s a book. – b. He’s reading a book. – c. Is the book open or closed? – d. The book is on the desk. – e. She’s picking up the book. – f. He’s closing the book. – g. He’s carrying a book. – h. Their books are on their desks. – i. We’re putting our books under our desks. – j. The bookcases are full of books. – k. I want to the library to read a book. – l. I’m using John’s books. – m. I looked at some books. – n. Did you take any book to home? – o. I took one book home. –